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One of the significant safety issues in nuclear power plants is the rupture of steam 
generator tubes leading to the loss of radioactive primary coolant inventory and 
establishment of a path that would bypass the plant’s containment structure. Frequency of 
steam generator tube ruptures is required in probabilistic safety assessments of 
pressurized water reactors to determine the risks of radionuclide release. The estimation 
of this frequency has traditionally been based on non-homogeneous historical data that 
are not applicable to small modular reactors consisting of new steam generator designs.  
In this research a probabilistic mechanistic-based approach has been developed for 
assessing the frequency of steam generator tube ruptures.  Physics-of-failure concept has 
been used to formulate mechanistic degradation models considering the underlying 
degradation conditions prevailing in steam generators. Uncertainties associated with 
unknown or partially known factors such as material properties, manufacturing methods, 
and model uncertainties have been characterized, and considered in the assessment of 
rupture frequency. An application of the tube rupture frequency assessment approach has 
been demonstrated for tubes of a typical helically-coiled steam generator proposed in 
most of the new small modular reactors. The tube rupture frequency estimated through 
the proposed approach is plant-specific and more representative for use in risk-informed 
safety assessment of small modular reactors.  
Information regarding the health condition of steam generator tubes from in-service 
inspections may be used to update the pre-service estimates of tube rupture frequency. In-
service inspection data are uncertain in nature due to detection uncertainties and 
measurement errors associated with nondestructive evaluation methods, which if not 
properly accounted for, can result in over- or under-estimation of tube rupture frequency. 
A Bayesian probabilistic approach has been developed in this research that combines 
prior knowledge on defects with uncertain in-service inspection data, considering all the 
associated uncertainties to give a probabilistic description of the real defect size and 
density in the tubes. An application of the proposed Bayesian approach has been 
provided. Defect size and density estimated through the proposed Bayesian approach can 
be used to update the pre-service estimates of tube rupture frequency, in order to support 
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1.1 Motivation and Objectives 
 
 
In nuclear power plants, pressurized water reactors (PWR) produce the heat that is 
used to generate electricity. This heat is generated through nuclear fission in the reactor 
core, which is carried by the primary coolants to the steam generators (SGs) where the 
heat is transferred across thin tubes to the secondary loop, to produce the steam that 
eventually expands through the turbine. The safety of PWRs depends to a great extent on 
the safety and reliability of its components and structures, especially the SG tubes. 
Besides keeping the reactor core at a safe temperature, SG tubes also act as one of the 
primary barrier between the radioactive (inside containment) and non-radioactive sides 
(outside containment) of a nuclear power plant (Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1: Typical nuclear power plant with large scale PWR (Source: US NRC)1 
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Since SG tubes play such an important role, any degradation and rupture in the tubes 
can be catastrophic because it can lead to: 
1. Loss of coolant, which can increase reactor core temperature and result in core 
meltdown. 
2. Release of radioactivity into the atmosphere bypassing the plant’s containment 
structure. 
3. Damage and rupture of adjacent tubes because of the close proximity of the tubes 
in a tube bundle. 
4. Rapid degradation and failure during other severe accident scenarios which create 
a harsh condition imposed against the tubes. 
Unmitigated reactor core meltdown is the most severe of all adverse consequences 
listed above as it recently happened at some of the Fukushima-Daiichi reactors in Japan 
caused by earthquake-induced tsunami (primary cause was the reactor coolant pump 
failure due to loss of both offsite and emergency powers, i.e., the so-called station 
blackout event). The second adverse consequence listed above results when the 
radioactive primary coolant leaks into the secondary side where pipes provide the only 
outlet through the containment into the atmosphere by means of pressure relief valves. 
The third adverse consequence has rarely occurred but can be catastrophic in terms of 
amount of radioactivity that can release into the atmosphere in a short period of time. The 
fourth consequence has been identified, but not experienced. 
There have been several occurrences of SG tube ruptures (SGTR) in the past. An 
SGTR event can be caused by any defect (e.g., crack, flaw, pit or other anomalies) that 
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propagates to 100% through-wall either under normal operating conditions or accident 
scenarios (e.g., station blackout or earthquake), leading to leakages, small or large scale 
ruptures having the potential to depressurize the primary side thus impairing its function 
(cooling the reactor core), and causing release of radioactivity into atmosphere. 
According to the Nuclear regulatory Commission (NRC), there have been 10 large-scale 
SGTR occurrences in the US between 1975 and 2000 (US NRC, 2010). These tube 
rupture occurrences caused loss of coolant accident (LOCA) that needed primary coolant 
replenishment using charging pumps.  
There have been several other reported and unreported cases of SG tube leakages and 
low scale ruptures, e.g., more than 100,000 (Diercks, Shack & Muscara, 1996). One such 
incident occurred in McGuire Unit 1 power reactor near Charlotte, NC on March 7, 1989 
(US NRC, 1990). The cause of the tube rupture was determined to be stress corrosion 
cracking (SCC) under normal operating conditions. In another incident, the North Anna 
power station in 1987 experienced an SGTR event when the plant reached its 100% 
capacity (US NRC, 1988). The cause of tube rupture was found to be fatigue, caused by 
combination of alternating stresses resulting from flow-induced tube vibration and flaws 
resulting from denting of tubes at support plates. 
Probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) of PWRs as required by the NRC are 
conducted to ensure plant safety and support regulatory decisions by analyzing scenarios 
that cause severe adverse consequences (e.g., reactor meltdown) and their associated 
frequencies (i.e., probability of occurrence per year). PWRs are designed and licensed 
using the PSA as the safety assessment method. In PSA of PWRs, SGTR is one of the 
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initiating events that can lead to severe adverse consequences. Estimation of the 
frequency of SGTRs has traditionally been based on historical data, which are gathered 
over a long period from operating PWRs having different SG geometries, environmental 
and operating conditions. These non-homogeneous historical data are combined to 
estimate the SGTR frequency. As an example in NUREG 1829, Tregoning, Abramson 
and Scott (2005) queried SGTR data from a database for a 15-year time period between 
1987 and 2002, shortlisted 4 SGTRs (Table 1) that had leak rates greater than 100 gallons 
per minute, and combined them to estimate the SGTR frequency based on calendar years 
of reactor operation.  
Another report (NUREG-5750) conducted a similar assessment of SGTR frequency 
combining non-homogeneous historical data (Poloski, Marksberry, Atwood, & Galyean, 
1999). Few things to note from Table 1 are that these four SGTR events were based on 
small break LOCA category 1 that were basically influenced by large diameter coolant 
pipes in large scale PWRs and injection pump capacity. About 75% of SGTR events 
resulted due to SCC, and the tube material was Alloy 600. Also, the non-homogeneous 
nature of the historical data makes the frequency estimates generic in nature and not 
plant-specific. 
Applicability of the historical data-driven frequency of SGTR to new small modular 
reactor (SMR) helical SG designs2 with different geometries, material properties, 
degradation mechanisms and thermal-hydraulic behaviors is certainly not valid. For 
example, in traditional SG designs SCC was the dominant degradation mechanism 
(Diercks et al., 1996) due to the use of Alloy 600 as tube material and the boundary 
                                                          
2
 Description of the basic design features of typical SMR SGs have been provided in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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conditions (primary loop being internal to tubes). However, with the proposed use of 
Alloy 6903 as tube material in new SMR SG designs (Figure 2) and different boundary 
conditions (high pressure primary loop applied to the outside of the SG tubes), risk of 
tube failure from SCC has been considerably reduced (Berge & Donati, 1981; Lee, Kim, 
Kang, & Chung, 2001; Lim, Oh & Lee, 2003; Chatterjee & Modarres, 2012). This makes 
the historical data totally irrelevant for the purpose of estimating SGTR frequency for 
new SG designs that are completely different from the operating fleet of PWRs. Further, 
SMR SGs have vastly different geometries, such as helical-shaped as opposed to U-
shaped or straight-through tubes, which accommodates thermal stresses due to expansion 
of tubes during normal heating at start-up. Also, the SMRs do not have the large diameter 
coolant loop pipes as compared to large scale PWRs.  
Table 1: Historical data used to estimate the SGTR frequency4 
 







1987  Fatigue  Alloy 600  
McGuire, 
NC  
1989  SCC  Alloy 600 
Palo Verde, 
AZ  
1993  SCC Alloy 600 
Indian Point, 
NY  
2000  SCC Alloy 600 
 
There is a need for a new approach for assessment of the SGTR frequency that does 
not rely on historical failure data, but rather considers the underlying degradation 
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 More information on Alloy 690 material is provided in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
4
 US NRC, 1988; US NRC, 1990; US NRC, 2000; Schallor et al., 1995; 
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http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/advanced/nuscale.html (Modified nomenclature from original)

























Most cases in literature have used statistical approaches for evaluating SGTRs  rather 
than probabilistic mechanistic models (Gosselin, Simonen, Pilli & Lydell, 2007). Only 
few previous studies have considered underlying degradation mechanisms to estimate the 
SGTR frequency. However, they were all focused on tube failures from specific 
degradation mechanisms (e.g., creep, SCC) that are a result of severe accidents (e.g., 
feedwater line break). This may have to do with the traditional design of PWRs, where 
thicker and large diameter primary coolant loop pipes posed far greater risk to overall 
plant safety than relatively thinner (of the order of 1-2 mm) and small diameter SG tubes. 
Hence, only those accident scenarios were considered in the past that could lead to large 
rupture in tubes resulting in large loss of coolants.  
Liao and Guentay (2009) used a creep rupture model to estimate SGTR probability in 
the reactor coolant pressure boundary, under severe accident conditions with 
countercurrent natural circulating high temperature gas in the hot leg and SG tubes. Cizelj 
and Roussel (2011) presented a SCC model for estimating tube rupture probability during 
severe accident conditions caused by feedwater line break. Although accident-induced 
SGTRs (e.g., earthquake, loss of off-site power) could provide a high potential of severe 
adverse consequences (e.g., the release of radioactivity into atmosphere), such accident-
induced SGTRs are easily detectable. More important in such accident scenarios is the 
safety of the high temperature reactor core and other critical components (e.g., large 
diameter coolant loop pipes). 
With changing designs, and emphasis on SMRs with integrated reactor and SGs and 
passive safety operations (that use natural forces such as gravity or natural circulation to 
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operate), nuclear power plants have become inherently safer. However, this has also 
brought new risk assessment challenges because the SGs are integrated into the reactor 
vessel directly above the core, and even small leakages from tubes can pose different type 
of risks to overall plant safety. Frequency of SGTRs during normal operating conditions 
needs careful attention as they can often go undetected (due to small leak rates) and lead 
to release of radioactivity into atmosphere and other adverse consequences (e.g., adjacent 
tube failure from increased turbulence level). Further, a comprehensive approach is 
needed to consider all the probable degradation mechanisms that can occur during normal 
operating conditions in PWR SGs, and estimate the total SGTR frequency.  
In this research a probabilistic physics-of-failure (PPoF) based approach has been 
developed for assessing the frequency of SGTRs that can support risk-informed safety 
analyses of new and existing PWRs. This approach is based on the principle that failure 
of passive systems is governed by mechanistic degradations created through the 
underlying environmental and operating conditions. The PPoF-based approach identifies, 
probabilistically models, and simulates potential degradations in new and existing SG 
designs to assess degradation versus time, until such degradation exceeds a known 
endurance limit. Physics-of-failure7 concept has been used to develop mechanistic 
degradation models for primary failure mechanisms considering the underlying 
degradation conditions prevailing in SGs. Uncertainties associated with unknown or 
partially known factors such as material properties, manufacturing methods, model 
uncertainties and measurement errors have been characterized. Procedures for assessment 
of stress agents during normal operating conditions have been provided considering 
                                                          
7
 Detailed description of physics-of-failure concepts have been provided in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
9 
 
uncertainties in tube geometry and material properties. A probabilistic approach has been 
provided for simulating the degradations in the SG tubes using the proposed PPoF 
models and under the applied stress agents, propagating all the associated uncertainties to 
estimate the distribution of SGTR frequency. An application of the SGTR frequency 
assessment approach has been demonstrated for a typical SMR that consists of helically 
coiled tubes fabricated with advanced alloys. The SGTR frequency estimated based on 
this probabilistic mechanistic approach is plant-specific and more representative for use 
in risk-informed safety assessment of new as well as existing PWRs.  
Since the SG tubes are subjected to variety of operating conditions during their life-
cycle, the degradations in tubes may not propagate as anticipated during the licensing or 
pre-service phase. Hence, it is critical to characterize the health condition of the SG tubes 
during in-service inspections, and update the pre-service estimates of the SGTR 
frequency. Tube degradations/defects are characterized through nondestructive evaluation 
methods during in-service inspections. Nondestructive evaluation methods are quite 
complex and it requires considerable skills from the operators to extract useful data from 
them. Also, the analysis and processing of the test data, to yield quantitative estimates of 
unknown existing defects, require careful consideration of various factors (e.g., physics-
of-failure) on the part of the analyst, whose level of experience is a critical determinant of 
the quality of the evaluation. Hence, the nondestructive evaluation process induces 
considerable detection uncertainties and measurement errors into the defect severity 
estimates. These uncertainties and errors, if not properly accounted for, can result in 
defect severity estimates not representative of actual tube degradations, and over- or 
under-estimation of SGTR frequency.  
10 
 
A defect of a given size might be detected only a certain percentage of the time (out 
of total attempts during nondestructive testing) depending on factors such as, noise level, 
test probe sensitivity, test equipment repeatability and human error. Hence, a defect has 
an associated Probability of Detection (), which can be defined as the probability 
that the inspection will detect the defect having the true size, , and is denoted by 
 (Kurtz, Heasler & Anderson, 1992).  
The precision and accuracy of nondestructive test equipment, and also the techniques 
used to analyze and process the test results can contribute to measurement errors. For 
example, large volume of sensor data (such as ultrasound or digital images) are filtered, 
smoothed, reduced, and censored into another form by subjectively accounting for only 
certain features of the data. Also, often measurement models are used to convert the form 
of a measured or observed data into the corresponding value of the reality of interest (i.e., 
defect size). Uncertainties associated with model selection and human errors can also 
contribute to measurement errors. These detection uncertainties and measurement errors 
need to be considered in order to estimate real defect severity in the tubes.  
In the past, there have been some efforts to model defect severity in structural 
components using nondestructive evaluation data. However, they have not been 
successful in considering all the uncertainties and errors associated with nondestructive 
evaluation methods. Rodriguez and Provan (1989) present a method to model pitting 
corrosion based on data from in-service inspection, considering only the POD in a 
simplified manner and ignoring the effect of measurement error. Cizelj and Dvorsek 
(1998) consider the impact of measurement error in inspection data on SGTR frequency, 
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neglecting the effect of POD. Lee, Park, Lee, Kim and Chung (2005) only considered the 
effect of POD to estimate the actual number of defects without considering the 
measurement error in inspection data. Hovey, Meeker and Li (2008) present a method to 
provide a joint estimate of in-service POD and crack size distribution through 
nondestructive evaluation. However, they assume that definite crack size information can 
be obtained through destructive methods, and hence did not consider the effect of 
measurement errors.  
Datla, Jyrkama and Pandey (2008) present an eddy current inspection-based pitting 
corrosion model considering only big size pits (> 50% through-wall depth), in order to 
overcome the nondestructive inspection uncertainties associated with small sizes. Though 
detection uncertainties are negligible, there is still considerable measurement error 
(especially systematic error) associated with big sizes. Celeux, Persoz, Wandji and Perrot 
(1999) describe a method to model defects in PWR reactor vessel welds considering the 
POD and random error in measurements. Yuan, Mao and Pandey (2009) followed the 
idea of Celeux et al. (1999), to propose a model for pitting corrosion in SG tubes 
considering the POD and random error of the eddy current measurements. However, both 
Celeux et al. (1999) and Yuan et al. (2009) did not consider the effect of systematic error 
or bias in measured defect sizes. Further, they did not consider uncertainties in the values 
of the POD, which can affect the defect severity estimates considerably. 
This research addresses some of the limitations of current techniques, and develops a 
Bayesian probabilistic approach for modeling defect severity (size and density) in SG 
tubes considering the detection uncertainties (i.e., POD and associated uncertainties) and 
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measurement errors (systematic and random errors, and associated uncertainties) 
associated with nondestructive evaluation methods. The proposed Bayesian approach 
combines prior knowledge of defect size and density with uncertain data from 
nondestructive evaluations considering the POD, measurement errors (systematic and 
random), and associated uncertainties to infer the posterior distributions of defect size 
and density.  
The combined effect of POD, measurement error, and  associated uncertainties on 
measured defect sizes is captured by a likelihood function. An application of the 
proposed Bayesian approach has been provided to estimate real/true flaw size and density 
distributions in SG tubes based on in-service eddy current evaluation data. An approach 
for updating the pre-service estimates of the SGTR frequency based on in-service flaw 
size and density distributions has been provided. The updated SGTR frequency can be 
used for in-service PSA of SMRs, in order to support risk-informed maintenance 
(replacement/plugging) of SG tubes and regulatory decision-making. 
1.2 Scope and Assumptions 
 
The scope and assumptions of this research are as follows: 
1. Only normal operating conditions-induced SGTRs have been considered. 
2. The primary degradation mechanisms identified in this research are based on 
normal operating conditions in typical new designs of helical SMRs. 
3. The PPoF approach for SGTR frequency assessment developed in this research 
can be applied both at pre-service stage as well as during in-service inspections. 
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4. Defects in SG tubes are assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
with a constant mean intensity (i.e., occurrences of defects may be represented by 
the homogenous Poisson process). 
5. Small leakages are included into the definition of SGTRs in SMRs, unlike the 
LOCA-based definitions that are not relevant to SMRs due to the absence of large 
diameter coolant pipes. 
1.3 Principal Contributions 
 The principal contributions of this research are: 
1. Development of a PPoF-based SGTR frequency prediction approach for SMRs. 
2. Development of two PPoF models for fatigue and fretting wear failure 
mechanisms in Alloy 690 SG tubes, addressing the limitations of existing 
deterministic models. 
3. Development of a Bayesian approach to estimate real/true defect severity in SG 
tubes using uncertain nondestructive evaluation data, involving POD, 
measurement errors, and associated uncertainties. 
4. Development of MATLAB-based tools to carry out the complex simulation and 
Bayesian inference numerical computations. 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
There are four major parts to this dissertation. The first part contained in Chapter 2 
presents the PPoF approach for assessment of SGTR frequency. Historical perspectives 
on SG tube degradation issues are first presented; discussing the evolution of tube 
degradation types over the years and measures taken to mitigate the risks from them. 
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Then the emergence of SMRs is presented discussing the need for such advanced designs 
and the economic benefits and safety features they provide. The issues with the current 
SGTR frequency assessment technique are then discussed, highlighting the need for new 
methods to assess the SGTR frequency for new SMR designs. Chapter 2 then presents 
historical evolution of physics-of-failure methodologies, and the emergence of PPoF 
approach for reliability prediction. The PPoF based SGTR assessment approach is then 
presented, detailing the various steps and considerations for its use. The degradation 
conditions existing in SMR designs during normal operating conditions are then 
discussed, including the applicable degradation mechanisms. Chapter 2 then presents 
proposed PPoF models for some of the applicable primary failure mechanisms occurring 
in SMR SG tubes during normal operating conditions. All epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainties associated with model and data are characterized using Bayesian regression 
approach in the form of probability distribution of model parameters. Procedures for 
assessment of stress agents are then provided considering uncertainties with tube 
geometry and material properties. Also, Chapter 2 presents a probabilistic approach for 
propagating all the uncertainties to estimate the probability distribution of SGTR 
frequency considering the proposed PPoF models and the acting stress agents. 
Chapter 3 provides an application of the PPoF approach for predicting SGTR 
frequency of a typical SMR design. The SMR design is first discussed in detail, along 
with prevailing degradation conditions during normal operating conditions and applicable 
primary failure mechanisms. The stress agents acting on the tubes are then determined 
using the proposed procedure in Chapter 2, which uses finite element analysis to obtain 
the stresses applied on the SG tubes during normal operating conditions. Then the 
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distribution of SGTR frequency is estimated for the SMR design, followed by a 
comparison between PPoF estimation and the historical estimation of the SGTR 
frequency.  
Chapter 4 presents the Bayesian approach for estimating in-service defect size and 
density distributions in SG tubes using uncertain information from nondestructive 
evaluations. Some historical perspectives on SG tube in-service inspections are first 
discussed. Then a detailed description of detection uncertainties and measurement errors 
associated with nondestructive evaluation methods is provided, along with various 
considerations for their modeling. Chapter 4 then presents a Bayesian probabilistic 
approach for estimating real defect severity in SG tubes accounting for nondestructive 
evaluation uncertainties and errors. Approaches for accounting epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainties associated with models and data used to characterize POD and measurement 
errors are presented. Then the Bayesian models for estimating posterior defect size and 
density are derived considering various types of nondestructive evaluation data, e.g., 
exact, interval, censored, and truncated. An integrated approach is then presented to 
incorporate the in-service defect size and density distributions estimated from the 
Bayesian approach to update the pre-service estimates of the SGTR frequency. The 
updated SGTR frequency can then be used for in-service PSA of SMRs to support risk-
informed maintenance of SG tubes and regulatory decision-making. 
Chapter 5 presents an application of the proposed Bayesian approach for estimating 
real flaw size and density distributions in SG tubes based on eddy current evaluation data. 
Eddy current evaluation uncertainties are first modeled using the techniques proposed in 
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Chapter 4. Then the flaw size and density distributions are inferred using the proposed 
Bayesian approach that uses in-service eddy current evaluation data for SG tubes.  
Finally, Chapter 6 provides summary and conclusions regarding the methods and 
approaches developed in this research for the assessment of the SGTR frequency. The 
principal contributions of this research are discussed in terms of their significance in 
improving the safety and reliability of new designs of SMRs. Recommendations for 
future work are provided to supplement the current research with more investigations and 

























CHAPTER 2:   PROBABILISTIC PHYSICS-OF-FAILURE 
BASED APPROACH FOR ASSESSING THE FREQUENCY 




2.1  Historical Perspectives on Steam Generator Tube Degradation Issues  
 
 
Commercial PWRs were first introduced in the late 1950s in US. Since then it has 
become the second largest source for electricity generation in the United States (accounts 
for more than 20% of total electricity generated). Various safety issues have plagued 
PWRs over the years. Degradation of SG tubes is one such issue that is an important 
consideration in the overall safety of PWRs. SG tube degradations have resulted in the 
plugging of more than 100,000 tubes around the world (Diercks et al., 1996). 
Early problems with SG tubes were caused due to wastage, which is caused by 
chemical attack from acid phosphate residues in areas of low water flow (Wade, 1995). 
This problem was associated with the use of specific water chemistry (low Na/P04 molar 
ratio phosphate). With the introduction of secondary water treatment for pH control, this 
problem was mitigated (Diercks et al, 1996). Then in the later years, problems with tube 
denting of Alloy 600 tubes became prominent. Denting is caused when corrosive material 
accumulates in the space between the SG tube and the support plate, leading to 
deformation of the tube. This problem was primarily attributed to the use of Carbon Steel 
support plates. Due to redesign of support plates and use of Stainless steel as plate 
material, the problem with denting was mitigated.  
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Once the problems with denting of tubes were solved, Alloy 600 (heat treated and 
mill annealed), became the primary choice of all SG tubes in most PWRs, because Alloy 
600 was considered to be resistant to corrosion. However, a new problem surfaced in the 
form of a degradation mechanism called SCC of Alloy 600 tubes, which became the most 
dominant cause of SG tube plugging across the world (Diercks et al., 1996). It was found 
that Alloy 600 was susceptible to SCC cracks due to chrome depletion and carbides 
formation in grain boundaries. Once the susceptibility of Alloy 600 tubes to SCC and 
other forms of corrosion was established, it was deemed fit to replace the tubes with a 
new material called Alloy 690, which had double the Chromium content (30%). 
Subsequent research established the high corrosion resistance of this new material. 
Majority of Alloy 600 tubes in operating PWRs were then replaced by Alloy 690, which 
helped solved to a great extent the problem with SCC failures. Currently, out of 69 PWRs 
with SGs in US, 61% have tubes made of Alloy 690, while the remaining is still made of 
Alloy 600 (US NRC, 2011).  
2.2  Emergence of Small Modular Reactors 
Usable electricity was first generated by nuclear power in 1951 in Idaho8. The first 
commercial PWR in US had a capacity of 60 MWe, run by Shippingport Atomic Power 
Station, Beaver County, Pennsylvania (1957)9. The trend in the subsequent years was 
more towards large reactors due to the economies of scale. This led to the development of 
large scale reactor designs with capacity of around 1600 MWe. However, in recent years 
there has been renewed interest in small scale designs, such as SMRs (Figure 3). SMRs 
                                                          
8
 Idaho National Laboratory, www.inl.gov 
9
 Wikipedia, “Shippingport atomic power station”, Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shippingport_Atomic_Power_Station 
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Figure 3: New designs of 
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 US NRC, “NuScale”, Retrieved from 
11
 Halfinger, J., “mPower: a Progressive Energy Solution”, April 2009, available online at 
www.state.nj.us/dep/cleanair/hearings/powerpoint/09_
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Energy Agency, 2005). Hence, the SMR designs are very different from traditional large 
scale PWRs that are in operation today. For example, the SGs and reactor core are 
integrated into one vessel and containment, doing away with the large diameter primary 
coolant loops. Further, use of passive safety features, such as natural circulation of 
primary coolant makes it more compact and safe as it does away with coolant circulation 
pumps. The compact design of the SMRs provides some economic benefits, in terms of 
the initial cost of building the plant, which is expected to be much less than those of 
constructing a large scale PWR. Also, the enhanced safety features make the SMRs a 
low-risk venture for power companies than other large scale PWRs (International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 2005). 
2.3  Issues with Traditional Steam Generator Tube Rupture Frequency 
Assessment Method 
While nuclear power plants provide affordable and clean electricity, there are severe 
adverse consequences, such as release of radioactivity into the atmosphere, associated 
with its failure. Risks from a nuclear power plant can be assessed by means of PSA13 
methods, which aim at answering three basic questions (Modarres, 2008): 
• What are the initiating events that lead to adverse consequences? 
• What is the probability or frequency of occurrence? 
• What and how severe are the adverse consequences? 
                                                          
13
 For more information on PSA techniques please refer to IAEA-TECDOC-1200 (IAEA, 2001). 
21 
 
There are three levels of a PSA. PSA level 1 identifies the initiating events (e.g., 
SGTR) and assesses the frequency of reactor core meltdown starting from initiating 
events. PSA level 2 assesses the frequency of release of radioactivity to the atmosphere 
starting from the reactor core meltdown. PSA level 3 assesses the risk to public health 
and environment by the release of radioactivity from the power plant.  
SGTR is one of the initiating events considered in level 1 PSAs that if not mitigated 
can potentially lead to core meltdown. SGTRs cause leakage of primary coolant to the 
secondary side leading to depletion of primary coolant inventory. This leads to 
insufficient cooling of reactor core, which can cause core meltdown. Further radioactive 
coolant that leaks to secondary side can release into the atmosphere through pressure 
relief valves in the secondary side. All scenarios involving SGTR are modeled in the PSA 
level 1.  
In traditional PWR designs, significant initiating events were identified as the rupture 
or leakage in primary coolant loop pipes connecting the reactor with the SGs. These 
coolant loop pipes had large diameters (approximately 10 times that of SG tube). Severe 
loss of coolant accidents through this large diameter pipes had the potential to cause rapid 
meltdown of core, due to inability of emergency injection pumps to replace the lost 
coolants. Hence, more research efforts were directed into analysis and quantification of 
frequency of primary coolant pipe ruptures. With SMR designs doing away with the large 
diameter primary coolant pipes due to integration of SG with the reactor core, SGTR 
failures became prominent initiating events.  
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Estimation of the frequency of SGTRs has traditionally been based on historical data, 
which are gathered over a long period from operating PWRs having different SG 
geometries, environmental and operating conditions. These non-homogeneous historical 
data are combined to estimate the SGTR frequency. Several US NRC reports, e.g., 
NUREG-1829 (Tregoning, Abramson & Scott, 2005) and NUREG-5750 (Poloski, 
Marksberry, Atwood, & Galyean, 1999) have used historical data to estimate SGTR 
frequency. An essential drawback of this approach is that these historical data are non-
homogeneous in nature, because they are collected from different operating PWRs. 
Hence the SGTR frequency would be generic and not-reactor specific. Another thing to 
note is that 75% of the cases of SGTR historically were caused by SCC mechanism due 
to the use of Alloy 600 material. Applicability of the historical data-driven frequency of 
SGTR to new SMR SG designs with different geometries, material properties, 
degradation mechanisms and thermal-hydraulic behaviors is certainly not valid 
(Chatterjee & Modarres, 2012).  
A comparison of some important features of SMRs with that of large scale PWRs 
(Figure 4) would reveal that the SMR design is very different from existing designs of 
PWRs. SMRs have helically-coiled tube bundles that accommodate thermal stresses; 
have advanced tube material Alloy 690, which has been found to be resistant to 
corrosion-related mechanisms; the high pressure primary coolant loop is on the shell side, 
which causes low level compressive stresses. This reduces the potential of SCC in SMRs 
to negligible levels, because SCC occurs under constant tensile stresses in corrosion 
susceptible materials. Therefore these historical frequency estimates that are dominated 




Figure 4: Basic design features of SMRs when compared to large scale PWRs 
 
 
2.4 Historical Evolution of Physics-of-Failure 
Reliability modeling and prediction of components has been considered historically 
by two different approaches: part stress modeling and physics-of-failure. Part stress 
modeling approach is an empirical method that is based on counting the number and type 
of components of the system, and the operating stresses14. Various standards (for 
electronics) have been published to specify how part stress modeling should be carried 
out, e.g., MIL-HDBK-217 (Department of Defense, 1991). These standards assume 
constant failure rate for components and require large amount of field data (Bowles, 
1992). The constant failure rate assumption works when failures are due to random 
events. However, wear-out dominated failures (e.g., fatigue, wear) could not be described 
by this assumption (White & Bernstein, 2008). This approach relies on databases of 
historical failures obtained mainly from field data and sometimes from reliability test 
data. However, these databases would not represent new designs that are completely 
different from existing ones. Further, these databases include data from different sources 
and environments, which make them generic in nature and not component-specific. These 
factors led to decrease in use of these empirical standards.  
                                                          
14
 Adopted from Wikipedia, “Reliability Engineering”, available online at  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reliability_(engineering)#Reliability_prediction_and_improvement 
SMRs:
• Helical shaped tubes
• Compressive stresses
• Advanced tube material resistant to 
corrosion (Alloy 690)
• Negligible risk from stress corrosion 
cracking
Large scale PWRs:
• U shaped or straight tubes
• Tensile stresses
• Tube material is susceptible to 
corrosion (Alloy 600)




Physics-of-failure approach, on the other hand, uses an understanding of physical 
failure mechanisms (e.g., corrosion, fatigue) to evaluate reliability of components. 
Physics-of-failure was first formally conceptualized in a symposium in 1962 organized 
by the Rome Air Development Center (RADC) 15. The driving force that established this 
approach to reliability were concerns in the 1940s and 1950s in US military 
establishments regarding the reliability of electronic systems. However, mechanistic 
treatment of failures had its roots in the late nineteenth century when in 1870 A. Wohler 
summarized fatigue test results on rail-road axles, and concluded that cyclic loads are 
more important for determining fatigue life than peak loads. Thereafter, much of the 
reliability work in the first half of the twentieth century was related to fatigue and 
fracture of materials (fatigue failure was the main concern during World War I). For 
example, Basquin (1910) proposed a log-log relationship for stress-life (S-N) curves 
using Wohler’s fatigue test data. Griffith (1921) introduced his theory of fracture while 
exploring the strength of elastic brittle materials.  
At the start of World War II, it was discovered that over 50% of the airborne 
electronics equipment in storage was “unable to meet the requirements of the Air Core 
and Navy” (McLinn, 2011). In 1950 the US Department of Defense (DOD) initiated an ad 
hoc group on reliability of electronic equipment, which stated that to improve part 
reliability it was essential to develop better parts, establish quantitative reliability 
requirements for parts, and collect field failure data to determine the root cause of 
problems (Ebel, 1998). However, the formation of the Advisory Group on the Reliability 
of Electronic Equipment (AGREE) in August 1952 by DOD is often considered the 
                                                          
15
 Now known as the Rome Air Force Research Laboratory. 
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turning point in modern reliability engineering. Several reliability techniques were 
recommended by AGREE, which were accepted by the Department of Defense and later 
by NASA and many other organizations supplying high technology equipment 
(Chatterjee, Modarres & Bernstein, 2012). Thereafter, several conferences began in the 
1950s to focus on various reliability topics. One conference that warrants special mention 
is the Holm Conference on Electrical Contacts, begun in 1955, which emphasized 
reliability physics. This conference established itself over the years as the primary source 
of reliability physics information on connectors (Ebel, 1998). 
Against the backdrop of the developments in mechanistic-based life models 
(particularly to assess fatigue and fracture failures) and the AGREE recommendations, 
RADC introduced a physics-of-failure program in 1961 to address the growing 
complexity of military equipment and the consequent higher number of failures observed. 
In 1962, researchers from Bell Labs published a paper on “High Stress Aging to Failure 
of Semiconductor Devices” that justified using the kinetic theory’s interpretation of the 
Arrhenius equation, a simple yet accurate formula for the temperature dependence of the 
reaction rate constant as a basis for assessment of temperature-induced aging of 
semiconductor devices (Dodson & Howard, 1961). Later, the RADC and Armour 
Research Foundation of the Illinois Institute of Technology (now IIT Research Institute) 
organized the first physics-of-failure symposium in electronics in September 1962 in 
Chicago. This symposium laid the groundwork for future research and development 
activities related to physics-of-failure by RADC and several other organizations. 
Numerous original papers and ideas introducing and explaining the physics-of-failure 
concepts and methods were presented in these symposia.  
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In one of the papers presented in the first physics-of-failure symposium, Vaccaro 
(1962) opined that physics-of-failure attempts to relate the fundamental physical and 
chemical behavior of materials to reliability parameters. This approach is based on the 
principle that to eliminate the occurrence of failures, it is essential to eliminate their root 
causes, and to do that one must understand the physics of the material and mechanisms of 
the failure involved. Davis (1962) described the need for identifying probable failure 
mechanisms by which components fail as a function of time, environmental and 
operating stresses, as well as developing mathematical models to represent these 
mechanisms in order to meet reliability requirements of components. Various companies 
and universities conducting research on failure mechanisms were identified during the 
symposium, e.g., Raytheon, Syracuse University, and Motorola. Although physics-of-
failure was key to improving design and reliability of components, higher costs in terms 
of facilities and manpower was identified as the key reason for not using physics-of-
failure at that time (Ryerson, 1962). The various key elements of physics-of-failure 
approach such as, failure mode, mechanism, and cause were defined for the first time in 
this symposium (Zierdt, 1962; Earles & Eddins, 1962).  
Due to the success of the first symposium in 1962, four physics-of-failure symposia 
were held in consecutive years (until 1966) with many more papers describing concepts 
related to physics-of-failure. For example, Tamburrino (1963) provided key points about 
the requirements of a reliability physics program, e.g., materials, measurement 
techniques, and failure mechanisms. The need for part vendors to be kept abreast of 
available knowledge and understanding in failure physics was identified. It was stated 
that any changes in pre-established part processing or fabrication can potentially be a key 
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factor in inducing new failure mechanisms, and should be closely coordinated with 
reliability engineers. Bretts, Kozol and Lampert (1963) provided accelerated tests results 
for resistors, which they correlated with physical degradation models to estimate time to 
failure. Physics-of-failure was identified as an essential step in planning accelerated tests 
as well as evaluating them.  
Ingram (1964) for the first time described performance characteristics and failure 
mechanisms of a device in probabilistic terms. He suggested that “Environmental and 
stress conditions applicable to the device, and its performance and strength 
characteristics, are expressed in the form of multidimensional probability distributions. 
By joint evaluation of these probability distributions, a quantitative estimate of the 
reliability of the device can be obtained.” Beau (1964) described methods for managing 
the human elements in physics-of-failure. He described three classical causes of failure 
as: reliability limitation inherent in the design; reliability degradation caused by the 
factory process; and reliability degradation caused by the user. The human element 
according to him is introduced in the factor process by the factory operator, e.g., poor 
workmanship or operator error. Workman (1964) described the failure analysis practices 
followed in Texas Instruments at that time, and the need for incorporating information 
gained from failure analysis in new reliability test design, process control, and new 
device design. 
Shiomi (1965) introduced a generalized cumulative degradation model for estimation 
and prediction of component life under successive different stress levels. Partridge, Hall, 
and Hanley (1965) described the need for qualification and engineering evaluations to 
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select vendors who are capable of supplying reliable semiconductor parts. They further 
stated that qualification tests alone are insufficient to determine the ability of vendors, but 
production procurement data from screen and burn-in can provide sufficient vendor 
history. Church and Roberts (1965) presented different causes of failure of a component, 
such as due to accidental damage during manufacture, assembly, testing, storage, or 
failure in service due to operating conditions or failure of another component.  
Thomas (1966) used basic concepts of dimensional analysis to make general 
examination of mathematical models, e.g., Eyring’s equation. He opined that the concepts 
of signal, noise and dimensionless variable can be used to formulate mathematical 
models, physical laws, and probability distributions. Schenck (1966) presented two forms 
of progressive failure mechanisms of a commercial silicon diode, and studied them as a 
function of various stress and measurement variables. Gill and Workman (1966) 
presented reliability screening procedures for integrated circuits, consisting of destructive 
tests as well as nondestructive inspections and screening. 
From 1967 on, IEEE sponsored the Reliability Physics Symposium (IRPS) that 
continues today to present a wide range of physics-of-failure related research. For 
example, Ryerson (1967) presented mathematical models for semiconductor diodes 
illustrating how failure mechanisms, part strengths, and application stresses interact and 
affect the failure rate of component parts. Keen, Loewenstern, and Schnable (1967) 
presented mechanisms of failure in ohmic and expanded contacts, including metal-
semiconductor contacts and bonds to metallization in semiconductor devices. Payne 
(1967) presented a failure mechanism for barium titanate capacitors studying the physics-
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of-failure. Frankel and Kinsolving (1970) discussed the need of reliability testing of 
components for hostile environments, by first simulating field conditions and then 
developing accelerating laboratory conditions. Hollingshead (1970) introduced a 
technique for optimizing the selection of parts for system application by reliability and 
quality levels through systematizing the compilation and processing of necessary data. 
The comparative influence of performance parameters such as repair cost, storage time, 
and cost of failure were discussed. Schwuttke (1970) showed that peripheral yield loss in 
silicon wafers can be minimized whenever temperature gradients arising during cooling 
of a row of wafers are eliminated. 
The IEEE symposium on reliability physics continued to be organized through the 
1970s and 1980s disseminating a plethora of knowledge on physics-of-failure. Several 
failure mechanisms and mathematical models were reported for a wide range of 
electronic components such as capacitors, semiconductors, resistors, and interconnects. 
Agarwala (1975) presented experimental results for electromigration failures in thin-film 
conductors. Brodeur (1975) described high temperature operating life test as a measure of 
processes used in fabrication of semiconductor wafers. Crook (1979) presented a model 
for time dependent dielectric breakdown of semiconductors as a function of operational 
and environmental conditions, as well as the device physical parameters. Hieber and 
Pape (1984) presented a creep-rupture equation that calculates time to rupture as a 
function of applied mechanical load and temperature. Conrad, Mielnik, and Musolino 




The IEEE Reliability Physics Symposium continued to be held in 1990s until today 
presenting physics-of-failure research. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, several 
publications on physics-of-failure related research separate from the IEEE Reliability 
Physics Symposium also appeared. For example, Pecht, Dasgupta, Barker, and Leonard 
(1990) advocated use of physics-of-failure approach for reliability assessment as opposed 
to the part count technique. Dasgupta and Pecht (1991) presented material failure 
mechanism and damage models. Engel (1993) presented failure models for mechanical 
wear modes and mechanisms. Pecht and Dasgupta (1995) discussed physics-of-failure as 
an approach to reliable product development.  
Although several studies related to physics-of-failure continued to be published 
through the 1990s and 2000s, a trend towards probabilistic consideration of physics-of-
failure also emerged from the early 1990s. For example, Hu, Pecht, and Dasgupta (1991) 
presented a probabilistic approach for predicting thermal fatigue life of wire bonding in 
microelectronics. Mendel (1996) formally described probabilistic physics-of-failure 
(PPoF) as a technique in which the statistical lifetime model is derived considering the 
physics-of-failure, and presented a case for applying PPoF in design for reliability. Later 
Modarres, Kaminskiy, and Krivtsov (1999) also recognized that prediction of failure is 
inherently a probabilistic problem due to uncertainties associated with physics-of-failure 
models and their parameters and with failure-inducing agents that can result from 
changes in environmental, operating, and use conditions. Several publications related to 
the PPoF then appeared from the early 2000s. For example, Haggag, McMahon, Hess, 
Cheng, Lee and Lyding (2000) presented a PPoF approach to reliability assurance of 
high-performance chips that considered common defect activation energy distribution. 
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Hall and Strutt (2003) presented PPoF models for component reliabilities by considering 
parameter and model uncertainties. Azarkhail and Modarres (2007) presented a Bayesian 
framework for physics-based reliability models. Matik and Sruk (2008) highlighted the 
need for physics-of-failure to be probabilistic in order to consider variations of variables 
involved in processes contributing to the occurrence of failures. Chamberlain, Chookah, 
and Modarres (2009) presented a PPoF model for reliability assessment of gas cylinders 
incorporating various uncertainties.  
Although quite a bit of research has been done on PPoF modeling for reliability 
assessment, this approach is still in its infancy stage with lot of scope for future research 
in terms of addressing the physics-of-failure of new materials and designs; more 
expansive characterization of uncertainties in failure-inducing agents, manufacturing 
methods, environmental conditions, model uncertainties and measurement errors; and 
propagating all the uncertainties (including parameter and model) to predict the failure 
frequency.  
2.5 Probabilistic Physics-of-Failure Based Approach  
In this research, a PPoF-based SGTR frequency assessment approach has been 
developed that considers physics-of-failure to formulate mechanistic degradation models 
affecting SG tubes; characterizes various uncertainties associated with factors such as, 
manufacturing methods, environmental conditions, operating conditions, material 
properties, model uncertainties, and measurement errors; and then simulates the 




In this section, the PPoF-based framework for SGTR frequency assessment is first 
presented with detailed discussions of key steps in the PPoF approach. This is followed 
by sub-sections on the identification of primary applicable failure mechanisms in SMRs 
considering the underlying degradation conditions; proposed PPoF models for primary 
applicable failure mechanisms considering all the epistemic and aleatory uncertainties; 
approach for assessment of stress agents acting on SG tubes considering uncertainties in 
tube geometrical and material properties; and a probabilistic approach for propagating the 
uncertainties to estimate the distribution of the SGTR frequency. 
The PPoF-based SGTR frequency assessment approach is as shown by Figure 5. The 
approach starts with identification of the degradation conditions prevailing in the SG 
during normal operating conditions, which are created by a combination of factors, 
including the SG design and the operating conditions (Chatterjee & Modarres, 2012). 
The design can be captured in terms of tube material, tube coil shape and geometry, tube 
geometry, number of support points, horizontal and vertical pitch, and primary and 
secondary coolant composition. The operating condition can be captured in terms of the 
primary and secondary coolant pressure and temperature, the mode of primary coolant 
circulation (forced or natural), presence of flow-induced turbulence or other vibration 
excitation mechanisms in the tube bundle, and presence of any corrosive particles in the 
primary coolant. The factors above create the degradation conditions that activate the 




Figure 5: PPoF approach for SGTR frequency distribution assessment 
 
Based on the prevailing degradation conditions in the SG, the dominant failure 
mechanisms are then identified. For example, the use of Alloy 600 tube material makes 
the tube more susceptible to corrosion related mechanisms, such as SCC. Fluidelastic 
instability or turbulence excitation leads to alternating stresses in the tubes that can cause 
fatigue if there is any localized degradation in the tubes. It is important to note that 
certain degradation conditions can lead to initiation of more than one degradation 
mechanisms. For example, corrosive conditions can cause corrosion fatigue and also SCC 
of tubes. However fatigue corrosion is caused by alternating tensile stresses (e.g., caused 
by tube vibrations), whereas SCC is caused by constant tensile stresses (e.g., caused by 
pressure differentials or residual stresses). Therefore it is important to understand each 
degradation mechanisms properly.  


























Having identified the primary applicable failure mechanisms, the next step is to 
formulate their PPoF models. The PPoF models (damage-endurance) are formulated 
considering the critical variables (e.g., among material properties, environmental 
conditions, stress agents, and geometry) that contribute to the creation of degradation 
conditions leading to onset of physical failure mechanisms.  For example, critical 
variables responsible for tube degradation by fretting wear mechanism are normal loads, 
oscillation amplitudes, oscillation frequency, operating temperature and material hardness 
of the contacting surfaces. Quantitative models are then formulated to correlate these 
critical variables with the damage growth parameter (e.g., wear volume loss rate) for the 
concerned mechanism (e.g., fretting wear). Material degradation data obtained 
experimentally at PWR environments are used to formulate the correlations. In some 
cases, well established correlations from literature for the concerned degradation 
mechanism are also used for this purpose, provided they apply to the experimental data. It 
is critical to ensure that the developed PPoF models properly represent the underlying 
degradation conditions and the underlying mechanical, chemical, or thermal processes 
that lead to failure of SG tubes. The epistemic and aleatory uncertainties associated with 
model and data are then characterized. For this a Bayesian regression framework needs to 
be developed that can combine prior information on model parameters with experimental 
data to infer the posterior probability distributions of parameters, including model error.  
Each failure mechanism has specific stress agents that propagate the degradations. 
For example, fatigue stress agents are alternating stresses whereas SCC stress agents are 
constant tensile stresses. A detailed finite element analysis (or other alternative approach) 
is required to determine the stress agents resulting from the prevailing operating 
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conditions, e.g., flow-induced vibration. Uncertainties in the input parameters for the 
finite element analysis, e.g., tube geometry, material properties, and environmental 
conditions need to be considered in the evaluation of stress agents. 
An approach needs to be then developed to propagate all the associated uncertainties 
(e.g., model, parameters, and initial flaws) to estimate the distribution of SGTR 
frequency using the PPoF models under the prevailing stress agents. Appropriate failure 
criteria need to be defined for each failure mechanism considering the operability or 
safety requirements of a particular PWR. For example, a failure criterion for normal 
operating condition-induced fatigue mechanism can be defined as the through-wall cracks 
reaching the wall thickness of tubes (Chatterjee & Modarres, 2012). However, in some 
cases such as accident induced failures, the failure criterion need to consider burst 
pressure and go beyond the wall thickness criterion. 
2.5.1 Identification of Primary Degradation Mechanisms during Normal 
Operating Conditions 
Degradation mechanisms are the physical, thermal, chemical, or electrical processes 
by which degradations (e.g., cracks, pits) initiate or propagate in a structural component. 
Degradation mechanisms occur due to operating conditions combined with geometrical 
and material properties. Operating conditions consist of environmental conditions and 
physical loads. Normal operating conditions16 in SMRs may include constant pressure 
differential (primary side: 15 MPa and secondary side: 6 MPa) across the tube thickness, 
inlet and outlet temperature conditions in the shell side (primary: superheated water) of 
                                                          
16
 Values for pressure differential and temperature conditions are not the actual ones used in any SMR SGs. The intent is to provide an 
idea of normal boundary conditions in typical SMR SGs. 
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315C and 275C respectively, inlet and outlet temperature conditions in the tube side 
(secondary: liquid water) of 220C and 275C respectively.  
The primary coolant flows by natural circulation through the tube bundle in the shell 
side of the SMR SG. This means that the flow velocity would not exceed small values in 
the SMR SG during normal operating conditions. Low-level of tube vibrations is 
generally observed in SG tube bundles during normal operating conditions. Due to cross-
flow through the helically-shaped tube bundles (as opposed to U-tubes or straight-
through tubes used in currently operating PWRs) in the SMR SGs, tube vibrations would 
be the primary cause of operational stresses.  
Performance demands were modest in the earlier days and also the power plant 
equipments were made robustly. Therefore, flow induced vibration problem was not 
considered a serious issue then. However, with increasing demand for higher 
performance and availability of better quality materials (e.g., high strength), SG tubes 
became more flexible and were subjected to higher flow rates (Weaver, Ziada, Au-Yang 
& Chen, 2000). Flow-induced vibration phenomena thus became an issue of significance. 
In PWR SGs, vibration of tubes can be excited by flow-induced mechanisms such as, 
fluid-elastic instability, turbulence excitation, and vortex shedding.  
Fluid-elastic instability is a self-excited mechanism and depends on the mutual 
interaction of fluid dynamic forces and the elastic structural displacements (Weaver, 
Ziada, Au-Yang & Chen, 2000). Fluid-elastic instability occurs only if effective gap flow 
velocity exceeds a certain critical velocity, and will lead to very high amplitude tube 
vibration (Axisa, Antunes, & Villard, 1990; Taylor & Pettigrew, 2000). Fluid-elastic 
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instability can be avoided through proper design of SGs. Vortex shedding is a form of 
periodic excitation and also leads to high amplitude vibration but is inhibited by 
turbulence. Fluid-elastic instability and vortex shedding lead to resonant vibration in the 
tubes, causing failure in quick time or overstress failures. These high amplitude vibration 
excitation mechanisms should not occur for normal operating conditions in SGs 
(Connors, 1981).  
Unlike vortex-induced vibration and fluid-elastic instability, turbulence-induced 
vibration cannot be avoided completely. Turbulence-induced vibration of tubes occurs 
even at low primary coolant velocities in SG tube bundles. Low levels of turbulence are 
desirable because it increases the efficiency of heat transfer. Turbulence-induced 
excitation forces the tubes to vibrate and induces enough response to cause long-term 
damage, e.g., fatigue and fretting-wear (Taylor & Pettigrew, 2000). Table 2 summarizes 
the vibration excitation mechanisms in SG, their occurrence conditions, and effect on 
tube reliability.  
Any severe transient condition that can lead to change in normal pressure differential 
or temperature conditions, or cause high-amplitude tube vibrations such as due to 
feedwater or steam header line break are not considered as normal conditions. Also, other 
accident scenarios such as loss of off-site power and earthquakes that can cause severe 
transients are not part of normal operating conditions. 
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Several probable degradation mechanisms may be prevalent in SGs during normal 
operating conditions, such as wastage, denting, pitting, SCC, fatigue, fretting wear. As 
discussed earlier, with the use of Alloy 690 risks from most of the corrosion related 
degradation mechanisms have been mitigated to a great extent (Table 3). Risks from 
creep failure were not considered because it is not likely to occur during normal operating 
conditions, due to high melting point of Alloy 690 material (approximately 1350C) and 
absence of any serious long term constant stress conditions during normal operation in 
the SMR SGs. However, Alloy 690 tubes with pre-existing flaws in the SMR SGs would 
be more susceptible to mechanical fatigue damage due to fluctuating stresses resulting 
from flow-induced tube vibration, thermal fatigue damage from thermal stresses, and 
fretting-wear damage from the relative motion between the tube and supports (Chatterjee 
& Modarres, 2012).  
Thermal stresses can result due to factors such as thermal coefficient mismatch 
between two dissimilar materials, and/or restraint on thermal growth. Temperature 
transients, e.g., during normal heating-up of tubes, can lead to thermal expansion of the 
tubes. In the helical-coil tube design, the tubes are free to expand radially and hence the 




Fluid-elastic instability High gap flow velocities 
High amplitude vibration and failure in 
quick time 
Vortex shedding Medium gap flow velocities
High amplitude vibration and failure in 
quick time 
Turbulence excitation Low gap flow velocities
Low amplitude vibration causing long-term 
damage, e.g., fatigue, fretting wear √
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expansion of tubes during normal heating-up (Cinotti, Bruzzone, Meda, Corsini, 
Lombardi, Ricotti & Conway, 2002). Also, thermal stresses by itself cannot cause a crack 
to grow, unless there is frequent shut downs and start-ups, chances of which are 
negligible unless there is abnormal conditions (severe temperature transients such as 
during meltdown). Table 3 summarizes the leading failure mechanisms that have been 
responsible for SGTRs in the past. Since the SMR SG tubes are made of Alloy 690 
material, which is resistant to SCC and other general corrosion mechanisms, mechanical 
fatigue and fretting wear have been considered in this research as the primary failure 
mechanisms with the potential to cause SGTR events under the normal operating 
conditions.  
Table 3: Identification of leading failure mechanisms in SG helical tubes during 





Failure mechanisms Degradation conditions Conditions in helical SG design
Stress corrosion
cracking
Constant tensile stresses, corrosion
susceptible material, corrosive 
environment
Compressive stresses, Alloy 690 tube material 
(high corrosion resistance)
Pitting corrosion
Corrosive environment, corrosion 
susceptible material
Alloy 690 tube material 
(high corrosion resistance)
Fatigue
Alternating stresses, localized 
degradation
Alternating stresses due to flow-induced tube 
vibration, manufacturing flaws
Fretting wear
Oscillatory small amplitude sliding 
motion between contacting 
components
Relative fretting motion between tube and support 





2.5.2 Probabilistic Physics-of-Failure Model Formulation  
In this section, PPoF models are proposed for mechanical fatigue and fretting wear 
degradation mechanisms in Alloy 690 SMR SG tubes. The PPoF models are developed 
considering the underlying degradation conditions that are a result of operating 
conditions and tube geometrical and material properties. All important variables that 
contribute to the creation of degradation conditions leading to onset of physical failure 
mechanisms (mechanical fatigue and fretting wear) have been considered systematically 
to formulate the PPoF models. Uncertainty analysis has been performed to characterize 
the epistemic and aleatory uncertainties associated with the models and the data, and 
estimate probability distributions of the PPoF model parameters. In the following sub-
sections, basic understanding of the failure mechanisms is first presented, followed by a 
literature survey of quantitative modeling efforts and experimental investigations. Then 
the proposed PPoF models are presented discussing the approach used to formulate the 
model considering the physics-of-failure, and characterize the uncertainties in the model 
and data.   
2.5.2.1  Fatigue 
Fatigue-induced fracture and rupture is one of the significant failure mechanisms in 
SG tubes that initiates from localized degradation and damage. For example, it may 
originate from corrosion pits or pre-existing manufacturing flaws. This research focuses 
on the cracks originated during the manufacturing process since the potential for pitting is 
negligible for Alloy 690. 
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ASTM Standard E-1150 (2010) defines fatigue as “the process of progressive 
localized permanent structural damage occurring in a material subjected to conditions 
that produce fluctuating stresses and strains at some point or points and that may 
culminate in cracks or complete fracture after a sufficient number of fluctuations”. Two 
types of fatigue failure can result depending on the load applied. If applied load is higher 
than the yield strength but lower than tensile strength of the material (enough to cause 
plastic deformation) then this results in low-cycle fatigue. However, if the applied load is 
lower than the yield strength (by two or three times) and causes elastic deformation then 
this results in high-cycle fatigue.  
Fatigue occurs due to alternating or cyclic stresses, e.g., bending and torsion. Also, 
the stresses need to be always tensile for fatigue crack propagation. Generally, stress 
concentrations in a structural component, e.g., pits, holes, corners, welds, and inclusions, 
are the hot spots that act as initiation point for fatigue failures. A typical fatigue rate 
curve is represented by crack growth per cycle of loading (
/
) versus the fluctuation 
of the stress-intensity factor at the tip of the crack () as shown in Figure 6, where  is 
the number of fatigue cycles. The curve is defined by three regions, i.e., I, II and III 
(Beden, Abdullah, & Ariffin, 2009). Region I represents the nucleation and initiation point 
for fatigue cracks; Region II represents the crack propagation zone where the crack 
growth rate (CGR) varies approximately linearly with the change in stress intensity 
factor; and Region III represents the unstable fatigue crack growth leading to sudden 
fracture. This research focuses on region II of fatigue rate curve, i.e., linear elastic region, 
since manufacturing flaws are considered to be the cause of initial cracks. Also, since the 
through-wall depth of SG tubes are of the order of few millimeters, the cracks are 
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assumed to grow linearly through the thickness of tubes. Accordingly in this research, 
fatigue failure is assumed to occur when through-wall cracks propagate to 100% through-
wall thickness of the tubes. 
 
Figure 6: Typical da/dN versus ∆K curve 
 
In order to understand fatigue mechanism it is also necessary to describe the three 
different modes of fracture, which represents ways of applying a load for crack 
propagation, as shown in Figure 7. Mode I crack is the opening mode, mode II crack is 
the sliding mode, and mode III crack is the tearing mode17. In this research we analyze the 
Mode I crack opening mode, because it is typically more critical from the design 
standpoint (lower fracture toughness with respect to Mode II and Mode III). 
 
Figure 7: Three modes of fracture17 
 
                                                          
17
 Wikipedia, “Fracture”, Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fracture 







Mode I Mode II Mode III
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2.5.2.1.1 Literature Review 
The fatigue crack growth prediction models are developed to support the damage 
endurance concepts in structures, and are based on fracture mechanics (Beden, Abdullah, 
& Ariffin, 2009). In the past, several models have been developed to predict fatigue crack 
growth under constant and variable amplitude loading. Paris and Erdogan (1963) 
proposed a power-law relationship between fatigue CGR and stress intensity factor range, 
which is more popularly known as the Paris Law. It is given by the following 






  ∆                                                                 1 
The limitation of the Paris law is that it does not consider the effect of stress ratio, . 
Walker (1970) improved the Paris model by including the effect of stress ratio, as shown 
in Eq. (2): 


    ∆1                                                           2 
Although stress ratio effect was introduced in the Walker model, it did not account 
for the region III (unstable) of fatigue curve. Forman (1972) proposed a model that can 
represent region III of the fatigue CGR curve, which is given by: 


  ∆1                                                         3 
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where  is the fracture toughness. All the models discussed so far are for the case of 
constant amplitude loading, which do not represent the fatigue CGR process during 
variable amplitude loading. During variable amplitude loading, stresses of differing 
magnitudes affect the CGR depending upon their sequences, as well as there are load 
interactions that can alter the CGR behavior (Beden, Abdullah, & Ariffin, 2009). Barsom 




  ∆"#                                                           4 
where,  
∆"#  %1& '(∆)*+), -                                                       5 
In Eq. (5), ) is the stress intensity factor range in the /01 cycle. Hudson (1981) used the 
RMS approach for predicting the fatigue CGR under variable amplitude loading that is 
based on Forman (1972) model: 


  ∆"#1  "#  ∆"#                                                 6 
Several investigations on fatigue crack growth in Alloy 690 material have also been 
conducted in the past. NUREG-6721 (Chopra, Soppet, & Shack, 2001) presents a model 
(Eq. 7) for fatigue failure of Alloy 690 SG tubes in PWR environments, based on some 
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investigations performed at the Argonne National Laboratory18. We term this model as 
the “Argonne model” in this research.  


  345671  0.82*.*Δ<.                                         7 
where, 34567 expresses the dependence on temperature. Park, Kim, Lee, and Rheem 
(1996) conducted fatigue crack growth tests to study the effects of heat treatment on 
fatigue behavior of Alloy 600 and Alloy 690 materials. Previous fatigue test results have 
shown no enhancement to the CGR of Alloy 690 in a PWR environment as opposed to 
CGRs in air. It has been demonstrated that SG Alloy 690 tube fatigue crack growth 
response under PWR environments can be characterized using standard specimen 
geometries (e.g., plates) in air (Young & King, 2005; Young, Gaoa, Srivatsan, & King, 
2006; Young, Van Der Sluys, & King, 2006).  
2.5.2.1.2 Proposed Probabilistic Physics-of-Failure Model  
For austenitic stainless steels, temperature, stress ratio, and cyclic frequency have a 
significant effect on CGRs (Chopra, Soppet, & Shack, 2001). In the Argonne model (Eq. 
7), the value of the exponent of stress intensity factor range was assumed to be the same 
as that for Alloy 600. This assumption can lead to fatigue CGR not representative of 
Alloy 690 since it has different material composition as compared to Alloy 600. Also, the 
functional form as well as the corresponding parameter values for stress ratio dependence 
was assumed to be same as that of Alloy 600, which again can lead to inaccurate 
prediction of fatigue life for Alloy 690 SG tubes. Further, all the parameter values were 





determined deterministically and hence the uncertainties in models and data were not 
characterized. These uncertainties can affect the fatigue life of Alloy 690 substantially. 
As has been discussed in earlier sections, fatigue CGR in a material can be affected 
by several variables prominent among them being loading ratio, loading frequency, 
applied cyclic loading, crack geometry, and component geometry. In this research we 
represent fatigue CGR in Alloy 690 SG tubes as a function of the critical variables that 
can affect the CGR in PWR environments, as shown in Eq. (8): 


  >>?, , ∆A, , B                                                  8 
where, >? is the loading frequency,  is the loading ratio given by CDEFCDGH,  where A  is 
the maximum stress in a loading cycle, and A)+ is the minimum stress in a loading 
cycle, ∆A is the applied load variation given by A  A)+,  is the crack through-wall 
depth, and B is the geometric factor that accounts for the crack length and component 
geometry. The effect of the applied load variation, crack through-wall depth, and 
geometry factor is represented by the stress intensity factor range, as shown in Eq. (9): 
∆  ∆A√JB                                                          9 
Paris and Erdogan (1963) established the power law relationship between the CGR 
and stress intensity factor range, which is widely accepted and used until today. This 
relationship also applies to the experimental data for fatigue crack growth in Alloy 690 
material in PWR environments, as shown in Figure 8. In this research, the power law 
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 L ∆                                                                    10 
The frequency dependence of the CGR was analyzed using available data for Alloy 
690 and was found to have no considerable effect on CGRs for the temperature range of 
interest (normal conditions). This was also substantiated by NUREG-6721 (Chopra et al., 
2001). The loading ratio significantly affects the fatigue CGR (Figure 9). NUREG-6721 
(Chopra et al., 2001) proposed the following functional form for stress ratio dependence 
of CGRs for the Argonne model, as shown in Eq. (11). However, it has not been 
described as to how this relationship has been formulated. Also, the deterministic values 
of function parameters estimated for Alloy 600 has been applied to Alloy 690.   
>  1  0.82*.*                                                   11 
 
Figure 8: Alloy 690 fatigue crack growth data (log-log)19  
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Stress intensity factor range, MPa.m^1/2
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Several other forms for stress ratio have been proposed, e.g., M   (Bamford, 
Liaw, & Eason, 1990); M N O (James & Jones, 1985); and  P7.7QRS< (Bernard & 
Salama, 1982) where M, , and O are constants. As can be seen from the Figure 9, 
decrease in stress ratio leads to increase in the CGR as a function of maximum stress 
intensity factor. Based on literature review and also some preliminary analysis using the 
experimental Alloy 690 fatigue crack growth data, we propose a functional form for 
stress ratio dependence as shown in Eq. (12), where M, T, and O are parameters.  
>  1  M0                                                     12 
 
Figure 9: Stress ratio effect on Alloy 690 fatigue CGR (log-log)20  
Using this functional form for stress ratio, the basic model structure for fatigue crack 
growth in Alloy 690 material can be represented as shown in Eq. (13): 
                                                          
20






































  1  M0∆                                                   13 
where, , , M, T, O are the model parameters expressing dependence21 on environmental 
conditions (e.g., temperature) and material properties (e.g., yield and tensile strengths). In 
order to verify the model structure and estimate the parameters characterizing all the 
uncertainties, a Bayesian regression approach (Figure 10) was developed. There are two 
basic forms of uncertainties: epistemic and aleatory. Moss and Kiureghian (2006) defined 
aleatory uncertainty as “inherent randomness that is a function of the phenomena that the 
model strives to predict”. This type of uncertainty cannot be reduced, whereas the other 
type of uncertainty (i.e., epistemic) can be reduced by using more and accurate data 
(without measurement errors), and also incorporating uncertainty in the input parameters. 
 
Figure 10: Estimating fatigue PPoF model parameter distributions 
 
                                                          
21
 Values of these parameters are obtained through regression analysis that uses Alloy 690 material degradation data obtained 
experimentally at PWR environments. Hence, values of these parameters represent dependence of CGR on environmental conditions 
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Bayesian approach was chosen for this analysis because it provides for the updating 
concepts, which provide a powerful means for knowledge management (Azarkhail & 
Modarres, 2007). In the Bayesian approach to regression, a large value of the likelihood 
function represents a better model fit to the data. The likelihood function is defined based 
on the distribution of model error, which for the best fitted model is assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation, A.  
The epistemic uncertainties are expressed partly in terms of posterior distributions of 
model parameters, e.g.,  and , and partly by the model error distribution. Aleatory 
uncertainties are expressed partly in terms of the model error distribution, and partly by 
the scatter in the measured data (e.g., CGR). The method used in this research to assess 
the proposed model is based on the value of the likelihood function. The likelihood 
function value was calculated using the posterior model parameters obtained from 
Bayesian regression. A model that results in a larger value of the likelihood function is 
the best-fit model. The proposed fatigue model equation is further re-written as following 
in order to make the variables on right side independent of each other. 


  1  M0P 1  S                                       14 
In order to define the likelihood function, we assume that the model error follows a 
normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ.  


  1  M0P 1  S N U0, A                              15 
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The likelihood function of & CGR data points for Alloy 690 material is defined using 
Eq. (20) assuming a normal distribution for the dependent variable, i.e., CGR, with same 
standard deviation as that of the model error, as shown in Eq. (16). 
V3W 
T|, , M, O, T, A*  1Y2J+A*+ Z[ \ 12A*(]3W)  ^1  M)0_` ,)1  )ab*
+
), c 
                       (16) 
 Since we started with no past experience (i.e., prior information about the distribution 
of parameters) in this research, non-informative or uniform prior distributions were 
assumed for parameters , , M, O, T and A. Experimental data for fatigue crack growth in 
Alloy 690 tubes from Argonne National Laboratory (Figure 8) were used to determine 
the marginal posterior probability density distributions for the parameters. WinBUGS 
d.14 (Cowles, 2004) software was used to perform the Bayesian regression analysis and 
obtain the posterior distributions. The resulting distributions of some of the parameters 
and model error are shown in Figures 11 & 12 below: 
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Figure 12: Distributions of model error and standard deviation 
 
In order to compare the extent of fit of the proposed model with that of other models 
to Alloy 690 fatigue crack growth data, Bayesian regression analysis was also performed 
with the Argonne and Walker (Walker, 1970) models. These two models were chosen for 
comparative analysis based on the facts that Argonne model was developed specifically 
for Alloy 600 and 690 SG tubes, and the Walker model is the earliest and most popular 
generic model for stress ratio dependence of CGRs in the linear region (Region II). It was 
found that model error was lower in case of the proposed model when compared to 
Argonne and Walker models. The likelihood function value was higher for the proposed 
model than the Argonne and Walker models (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Comparison of proposed, Argonne, and Walker models 
 
Model 




Proposed 3.64e-8 1123.52 
Argonne 3.74e-8 1090.68 
Walker 3.71e-8 1061.38 
 
Model error
-2.0E-7 -1.0E-7     0.0 1.00E-7













In order to rank the three models according to goodness of fit, two information 
criteria were used: Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974) and Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978), as shown by Eqs. (17) and (18).  
ef3  2g  2hijV                                                         17 
kf3  2 hijV N ghij&                                                    18 
where, g is number of independent model parameters, & is number of data points, and V 
is maximized value of likelihood function. According to these criteria, the preferred 
model is the one with minimum AIC or BIC values. The proposed model was the best-fit 
model for the Alloy 690 fatigue CGR data according to both the criteria (Table 5). 





Bayesian information  
criterion 
Value Rank Value Rank 
Proposed -2237.04 1 -2236.02 1 
Argonne -2173.36 2 -2172.54 2 
Walker -2116.76 3 -2116.15 3 
 
This proposed model can better predict the fatigue crack growth in Alloy 690 
materials in air as well as PWR environments. The mean and standard deviation values of 












µc, σc 5.02e-12, 2e-13 
µp, σp 3.1, 0.088 
µt, σt 2.3, 0.48 
µb, σb 3.03, 1.12 
µz, σz 0.542, 0.187 
µσ, σσ 3.64e-8, 2.04e-9 
 
To account for operational stresses (i.e., resulting from flow-induced random 
vibrations) it is necessary to modify the proposed PPoF model accordingly. Barsom 
(1976), Hudson (1981), and Kim, Tadjiev, and Yang (2006), have modeled fatigue crack 
growth under random amplitude loading by using ∆"# and "# in Paris and modified 
Paris equations. During random vibration, the RMS value of the maximum stress 
intensity factor can be described as shown: 
 ,"#  A ,"#√JB                                                  19 
A ,"#  l∑ A ,)*+), &                                                    20 
where, A ,"# is the RMS value of maximum applied stress for the variable amplitude 
loading, and A ,) is the maximum value of stress in /01 loading cycle. As discussed 
earlier, "# can be calculated as: 
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"#  A)+,"#A ,"#                                                          21 
We substitute  ,"# and "# in the proposed PPoF model (Eq. 14) to represent 
fatigue crack growth in Alloy 690 SG tubes in PWR environments subject to random 
vibration stresses, as shown in Eq. (22):  


  ^1  M"#0_` ,"#1  "#a                           22 
2.5.2.2  Fretting Wear 
Fretting wear is a surface degradation process that results due to small amplitude 
oscillatory motion between two surfaces in contact. During heat exchange in SG tube 
bundles, there is fine flow-induced vibrations of the tubes causing fretting-wear between 
the tubes and support plates. Fretting-wear is a very serious problem in the safety of 
nuclear power plants (Kim, 1997; Lim et al., 2003; Jo et al., 2008) because relative 
motion between tube and support plates leads to loss of tube wall thickness at the support 
locations, and may go to the point when the tube thickness is unable to withstand the 
stresses due to primary to secondary side pressure differential causing catastrophic 
rupture and loss of coolant (Chatterjee & Modarres, 2012).   
Fretting wear occurs as a result of combination of mechanisms such as adhesion, 
delamination, and abrasion (Fitch, 1992). At the initial stages, the asperities on the 
contacting surfaces adhere under the applied load. The softer asperities then shear off due 
to oscillatory motion of the surfaces, resulting in wear particles that accumulate in 
between the contacting surfaces. The harder asperities then cause plastic deformation in 
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the softer material, and removes sheets of particles, which further accumulate in between 
the contacting surfaces. The accumulated wear particles then cause abrasion resulting in 
expansion of the wear zone (Fitch, 1992).   
Both fluid flow as well as design of SG can impact the fretting wear of tubes. 
Vibration frequency and impact force at the supports are some of the parameters 
governed by fluid-flow. Tube-support clearance and material combinations are some of 
the parameters governed by the design. 
2.5.2.2.1 Literature Review 
The Archard’s wear equation (Archard & Hirst, 1956) is the most popular wear 
model used even today in wide range of applications. The Archard’s wear law is found to 
be applicable to most fretting wear experimental data.  The most common form of the 
equation is shown in Eq. (23).  Here n is the wear volume lost, g /s the wear coefficient, 
o is the normal force, and V is the sliding distance. 
n  goV                                                                   23 
Frick, Sobek, & Reavis (1984) developed a model based on Archard wear relationship 
to correlate non-linear wear parameters (tube/support plate contact forces and tube 
motions) to wear volume in rate form, as shown in Eq. (24): 
np  gqp                                                                     24 
where, np  is the wear volume rate and qp  is the work rate (work per unit time) implied by 
tube/support relative motion and contact forces. Various other studies have also been 
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carried out to study the fretting-wear phenomena of heat exchange tubes. Blevins (1979) 
studied the fretting-wear of heat exchanger tubes in nitrogen/air moisture at room 
temperature. The effects of tube/tube support clearance eccentricity, vibration frequency 
and mid span displacement were investigated. It was established that tube wear decreases 
substantially with decreasing tube/tube support plate gap. Fretting wear studies have also 
been carried out for SG tubes at Chalk River National Laboratories (CRNL) to 
investigate the effect of various parameters (Ko, 1985). It has been determined that for 
certain tube material (e.g., Alloy 600) the wear rate increases with increase in 
temperature and tube/tube support plate gap.  
The vibration mechanisms responsible for fretting wear of SG tubes are fluid-elastic 
instability, vortex shedding, and turbulence. These mechanisms have been discussed in 
detail in Section 2.5.1. Various other studies have been conducted to investigate wear 
behavior of SG tubes in PWR operating conditions (Lee et al., 2001; Lee & Kim, 2002; 
Hong & Kim, 2005). Different materials have been investigated, e.g., Alloy 600, Alloy 
800, and Alloy 690, both at room temperatures and high PWR operating temperatures. It 
has been observed that for Alloy 690 material, fretting wear rate is less at higher 
operating temperatures than that at room temperatures (Figure 13). At room temperatures 
the material loss is due to abrasion and plastic deformation, while at higher operating 
temperatures the material loss is due to adhesion and plastic deformation. Also, it has 
been reported that wear rate of Alloy 690 is lower than that of Alloy 600 possibly 
because of stacking fault energy difference in between the two materials (Hong & Kim, 
2005). To reduce fretting wear failures of SG tubes, tube/tube support materials should be 
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chosen with care because wear rate of some material combinations may be higher than 
others under similar vibration conditions (Ko, 1985; Hong & Kim, 2005).  
 
Figure 13: Alloy 690 fretting wear data at room and elevated temperatures22  
 
2.5.2.2.2 Proposed Probabilistic Physics-of-Failure Model 
Fretting wear mechanism is greatly affected by the oscillation amplitude, normal 
loads, material hardness, oscillation frequency and number of wear cycles. Fretting wear 
volume loss in Alloy 690 SG tubes can be expressed as a function of the following 
critical variables: 
n  >o, V, >?, r                                                         25 
where, n is the volume of material lost, o is the normal load causing wear, V is the 
oscillation amplitude (sliding distance), >? is the frequency of oscillation, and r is 
hardness of contacting components. The Archard’s equation (Archard & Hirst, 1956) for 
sliding wear correlates volume loss with some of the above variables. This equation has 
been shown to be adequate for evaluating fretting-wear in SG tubes (Connors, 1981; Jo et 
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al., 2008). Archard’s equation is a linear relation between wear volume, local loads and 
sliding distances, as shown in Eq. (26):  
n  gsoVr                                                                     26 
where, gs is the wear coefficient. The wear volume loss is inversely proportional to the 
hardness of the softer material. The limitations with Eq. (26) are that it does not account 
for contacting surface geometry or interactions, and the effect of oscillation frequency.  
The PPoF model for fretting wear of Alloy 690 SG tubes is developed in this research 
accounting for tube-support plate interactions and geometry, and also the frequency of 
oscillations. Eq. (26) can be expressed in rate form as: 

n
T  go 
V 
T                                                                27 
where, g  gs/r is the wear coefficient that includes the hardness property of the 
contacting materials. In this research we assume that failure by fretting wear occurs when 
the wear depth propagates to 100% through-wall thickness of the tube. Failure can also 
occur much earlier due to development of fatigue cracks in the wear area. However that 
possibility is neglected in this research and failure due to wall-thinning by pure fretting 
wear is considered. An equation that correlates the tube wear volume loss with the wear 
depth is needed in order to estimate the failure probability. In order to formulate such an 
equation we would need to consider the geometry and interaction between the tube and 
support plates. Progressive fretting-wear between the tube and support plate (as shown by 
horizontal lines in Figure 14) leads to reduction in tube through-wall thickness (due to 
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loss of black shaded wear area) as represented by wear depth, t and wear angle, u. Wear 
angle increases with the wear depth and reaches a maximum value when wear depth 
reaches 100% through-wall thickness of tube. 
 
Figure 14: Schematic of SG tube-support plate interaction 
This modeling effort assumes that volume loss during fretting-wear occurs only in the 
SG tube with negligible wear in support plates. Alternatively the wear volume, measured 
by the loss of material during fretting-wear, can be represented in terms of the wear angle 
as,  
n  *h2 P2u  v/&2uS                                                     28  
where,  is outer radius of tubes, and h is effective support length. The Eq. (28) can be 
expressed in rate form as shown in Eq. (29): 

n
T  *hP1  iv2uS 
u
T                                                    29 
61 
 
From Eqs. (27) and (29), the rate of change of wear angle with time (wear rate) can 
be derived as shown in Eq. (30). Wear contact angle (u) is given by iv1  t/, 
which varies from iv1  t)/ to iv1  tw/, where t) is initial wear depth 
and tw  is final or critical wear depth. 

u
T  go 1*hP1  iv2uS 
V
T                                                30 
 
The rate of change of sliding distance with time during fretting-wear between helical 
SG tubes and support plates under turbulence-induced vibration is expressed by Eq. (31), 
where RMS is root mean square displacement of helical tubes under turbulence-induced 
random vibrations, and x is fretting-wear period (Jo et al., 2008). 

V
T  4yzx                                                                  31 
Substituting Eq. (31) to the proposed fretting-wear PPoF model (Eq. 30) results in Eq. 
(32) for simulating fretting-wear in helical Alloy 690 SG tubes under turbulence-induced 
random vibrations, where  represents the number of wear cycles. 

u
  go 4yz*hP1  iv2uS                                                    32 
In Eq. (32), wear coefficient g is considered as random and estimated 
probabilistically using a Bayesian regression approach, as shown in Figure 15. 
Experimental fretting wear volume loss data for Alloy 690/stainless steel plate 
combination (Figure 16) were used for the regression analysis. This accounts for 
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uncertainties in fretting-wear phenomena as well as the material properties of contacting 
components. The fretting wear data used for regression were obtained from experiments 
at room temperatures. As discussed earlier, fretting wear rate is lower at elevated PWR 
temperatures when compared to room temperatures. Therefore, the proposed PPoF model 
for fretting wear would give a conservative estimate of the SGTR frequency. 
Wear data is obtained in the form of wear volume loss rate (np ) versus the work rate 
(qp ), which involve the non-linear parameters (tube/support motion and dynamic contact 
forces). Wear volume rate is correlated with the work rate using the wear coefficient. 
This correlation is widely used to evaluate and estimate fretting wear damage in SG tubes 
(Kim, 1997; Lee, 2001). In order to define the likelihood function using the work rate 
equation, it was assumed that the model error follows a normal distribution with mean 
zero and standard deviation A, as shown in Eq. (33).  
np  gqp N U0, A                                                        33 
 
















A normal distribution for the dependent variable, i.e., np  was assumed to define the 
likelihood function (Eq. 34) of & data points (np  dv.qp ) with the standard deviation same 
as that of the model error.  
VqZ? 
T|g, A*  1Y2J+A*+ Z[ \ 12A*(^np)  gqp )_*
+
), c                 34 
Non-informative or uniform prior distributions were assumed for the parameters g 
and A. Experimental data (Figure 16) for fretting-wear rate in Alloy 690 tubes/stainless 
steel support plates was available to determine the marginal posterior distributions for the 
parameters.  
 
Figure 16: Alloy 690/Stainless Steel fretting wear data23  
WinBUGS v.14 software (Cowles, 2004) was used to perform the Bayesian 
regression analysis and obtain the posterior distributions. Figure 17 illustrates the 
posterior marginal distributions of g and A. The mean and standard deviation of model 
parameters are illustrated in Table 7. 
                                                          
23

























            
Figure 17: Posterior distributions of PPoF model parameters { & | 
 
 




2.5.3 Probabilistic Stress Agents Assessment Approach 
Fluid flow-induced turbulence on SG tube bundles is a classic case of random 
vibration, the analysis of which can be carried out in either the time or frequency 
domains. When using time domain the input is in the form of time history of turbulent 
forces. The structural response is derived using finite element analysis, and the output is 
also expressed as a time history, e.g., stress at some particular location in the tubes. In the 
frequency domain, the input is expressed as power spectral density (PSD) of turbulent 
forces. The output from the model is then expressed as PSD of stress (Bishop, N. and 
Caserio, A., 1998). 
Turbulence-induced tube vibration analysis is performed using the theory of random 
vibration in this research. Turbulent primary fluid pressures, [, ө, T, acting on the tube 
Parameter, k
    0.0 2.0E-11 4.0E-11






    0.0 2.0E-13 4.0E-13






Values estimated through 
Bayesian regression
µk , σk 3.04e-11, 4.1e-12
µσ , σσ 1.172e-13, 2e-14
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surface in all directions is shown in Figure 18, where  is outer radius of the tube and T is 
time.  
 
Figure 18: Turbulent fluid pressures acting on tube cross-section in all directions 
(Blevins, 1990) 
 
At any instant in time, these surface pressures will exert a net lateral turbulence force 
per unit length, o}, on the tube (Figure 19), as shown in Eq. (35) (Blevins, 1990).  
o}  ~ [, , Tiv

[                                                 35*7  
 
Figure 19: Force acting on a tube in a turbulent flow (Blevins, 1990)  
The partial differential equation of motion of a uniform rod responding to this force is 









vertical direction,  is the modulus of elasticity,  is the mass per unit length, and f is 
the moment of inertia of the cross-section about the neutral axis. 
f <BM, TM< N*BM, TT*  o}M, T                                        36 
The approach developed in this research for determining the response of SG tubes to 
the turbulence forces is shown in Figure 20 (Chatterjee & Modarres, 2012). The 
approach uses finite element methods to determine the turbulence-induced random 
vibration amplitudes and stresses. The approach starts with the development of a finite 
element model of the SG tube based on tube geometrical parameters and material 
properties: e.g., tube diameter and thickness, young’s modulus, and material density. 
Uncertainties in the geometrical parameters and material properties are considered in the 
analysis. Modal analysis is then required to determine the tube modal parameters such as 
natural frequencies and modal stresses. 
The most critical step in this approach is to determine an appropriate PSD forcing 
function that characterizes the flow-induced turbulence conditions for the SG tube 
bundle. The PSD function can be developed experimentally for particular applications 
and operating conditions, e.g., single-phase cross flow. Once the PSD forces are 
determined based on flow parameters, the next and final step is to conduct random 
vibration analysis to determine the response of the SG tubes, i.e., random vibration 




Figure 20: Random vibration analysis approach 
 
The auto spectral density of turbulence-induced force normal to the axis of a cylinder 
in single-phase cross flow in SGs can be represented by Eqs. (37) and (38) (Axisa et al., 
1990), where SFy is the auto spectral density of turbulence-induced force,  is fluid 
density,  is average cross-flow velocity through the minimum gap between tubes,  is 
tube outside diameter, and >)/ is dimensionless spectral shape function.  
z  12**  >                                                     37 
 >)   
4  10< >) 7.Q , 0.01  >)   0.23  105 >) .Q , 0.2  >)   3
                         38 
Determine geometrical parameters 
and material properties
Develop finite element model
Conduct modal analysis
Determine the PSD of 
turbulence induced forces
Conduct random vibration 
analysis




 Force PSD calculations can be then performed using a range of fluid gap velocities in 
the tube bundle using Eqs. (37) and (38). These fluid gap velocities can be obtained using 
thermal hydraulic analysis of the primary coolant flow through the helical tube bundles. 
In order to ensure that there is no fluid-elastic instability in the tubes, critical velocity of 
the tubes need to be computed using Eq. (39) (Connors, 1981). The gap velocities in the 
tube bundle should not exceed this critical velocity.  
n,+>+  3 2J00* 7.Q                                                    39 
In Eq. (39), n,+ is the critical velocity for the &01 free vibration mode, 3 is fluid-
elastic instability coefficient, 0  is damping ratio, 0  is total mass per unit length of tube,  is density of external fluid, and  is external tube diameter. Maximum PSD bending 
stresses and displacement amplitudes can be determined from finite element analysis for 
various gap flow velocities. The normal force initiating wear is determined assuming a 
clearance between the tube and its supports. Normal force initiating fretting-wear, o+, can 
be expressed in terms of the normal component of ?v response obtained from random 
vibration analysis as shown in  Eq. (40): 
o+  g|"#|  j,    />  |"#|  j 
o+  0,    />  |"#|  j                                                      40 
where, g is equivalent stiffness of tube support interaction, j is diametric clearance 
between a tube and its support, and "# is a normal component of ?v tube 
displacement (Au-Yang, 2001). The value of stiffness, g, can be obtained from the 
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standard tube localization model as shown in Eq. (41) (Axisa, Desseaus, & Gilbert, 1984; 
Au-Yang, 2001), where t is tube thickness and  is Young’s modulus of tube material. 
The model assumes that an equivalent linear spring acts in the direction of motion as 
soon as tube-support impact occurs, and the tube is much less rigid than the support 
structure. 
g  1.9t* lt                                                             41 
Since the stress agents result from turbulence-induced vibrations, different locations 
along the tube in SMRs would have different values of stress agents. For example, a 
helical span (length of tube between two support plates) would have different 
distributions of stress agents at different locations along the span. For each location along 
the span, distribution of stress values can be used in the fatigue reliability simulation, 
whereas vibration amplitudes at the tube/support locations can be used to calculate the 
normal force initiating wear and rate of change of sliding distance with time, which can 
then be used in the fretting-wear reliability simulation. 
2.5.4 Probabilistic Approach for Uncertainty Propagation and Rupture Frequency 
Estimation 
A probabilistic approach was formulated to propagate the PPoF model parameter 
uncertainties, and estimate SGTR frequency under the acting stress agents. The 
probabilistic approach is shown in Figure 21. Starting from initial flaw size distribution24, 
                                                          
24
 To estimate remaining life of SG tubes during in-service inspections, initial flaw size and density distributions would be obtained 
from the nondestructive evaluations and PPoF approach would be applied from that point onwards. A Bayesian approach for true flaw 
size and density estimation using nondestructive evaluation data is presented in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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degradation growth analysis is carried out for each mechanism of interest using their 
respective PPoF models and for random samples of model parameters, to obtain the final 
flaw size distribution
25
 at the mean life of SG (T).   
 
Figure 21: Flaw (e.g., crack) growth simulation using PPoF models 
 
For each random sampling of PPoF model parameters for the mechanism of interest, 
final flaw (e.g., crack) size distribution is obtained at the mean life of SG, as shown in 
Figure 22. In Figure 22, the parameters  and  are for representation purpose only. As 
we have discussed earlier, fatigue PPoF model has five model parameters, whereas 
fretting wear PPoF model has one model parameter (wear coefficient). Each realization 
of final flaw size distribution is for one location of a tube span under the acting stress 
agent at that location. Generally the tube/support locations are the most critical in terms 
of flaw severity. However, it is probable that flaws can occur at all locations along a tube 
span. 
                                                          
25
 The time-to-failure (TTF) distribution shown in Figure 21 denotes the failure time for all cracks, whereas the final crack size 
distribution denotes the status of cracks (i.e., crack sizes) at the mean life of SG. The area of the TTF distribution corresponding to 




Figure 22: Considering parameter uncertainties 
For SGTR frequency estimation using fretting wear PPoF model, we only consider 
the tube/support locations of a tube span, since fretting wear is not possible at other 
locations along a span. But for SGTR frequency estimation using fatigue PPoF model, we 
consider several different locations along a span. For example, one helical span can be 
divided into & equal size divisions. Each tube location/division would have several nodes 
and each node would have different values of stress agents (e.g., stress or amplitude). For 
each location, starting from initial flaw size distribution, final flaw size distributions 
“r” random samples 
from joint distribution 












final flaw depth at 
mean life of PWR
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would be obtained at mean life of SG for all acting stress agents at all nodes, and a 
weighted distribution of final flaw size would be obtained for that location or division. 
The probability of SGTR at one location or division is then estimated by determining 
probability of flaws exceeding the critical flaw limit (from the cumulative density 
function of final flaw size), where critical flaw limit (") is assumed in this research as 
the through-wall thickness of tubes, as shown in Eq. (42).  
?"^zWEzeE_  ?^w  "_                                      42 
In Eq. (42), zeE are the prevailing stress agents at /01 location or division. Since, at 
one location there can be multiple flaws, a flaw density distribution is used assuming 
Poisson distribution to consider the probability of SGTR for all flaws at one location or 
division, ?"^zW4 w# 0 EzeE_. Similarly, the SGTR probability at all & locations or divisions in a span are estimated and summed (assuming independency) to 
obtain the SGTR probability for one helical span of the SG tube, as shown in Eq. (43). 
?"zW+ (?"^zW4 w# 0 EzeE_+),                     43 
Since the number of spans in one helical turn of a tube bundle is equal to the number 
of support points in that turn, the total number of spans in a tube can be estimated by 
considering the total numbers of turns in that tube. Then the total number of spans in 
entire SG can be estimated by considering the total number of tubes in the SG. For 
example, if there are four spans in a helical turn and five helical turns in a tube, the total 
number of spans in a tube would be 20. If there are 1000 tubes in the SG then total 
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number of spans in the SG is 20,000. The SGTR probability for entire SG due to fatigue 
mechanism is then estimated by summing over all spans (assuming symmetry along all 
spans and independency), as shown by Eq. (44). 
?"zW+0)"  ¡  ( ?"zW+                                   444 #+#  
For estimating the SGTR frequency due to fretting wear, the SGTR probability at 
only the tube/support locations along a span are estimated. Then, considering the total 
number of support points for all tubes, SGTR probability for entire SG is obtained by 
summing (assuming independency) over all support points. The SGTR probability 
estimated by this approach is for one random sampling of PPoF model parameters. For ? 
random sampling, there would be ? SGTR probabilities, which can then be fitted into a 
probability distribution to represent the uncertainties. The SGTR frequencies are then 
estimated by dividing the SGTR probability values by the mean (or remaining) life of SG 
to provide yearly estimates of frequency. A MATLAB routine was developed to 
implement this approach. An application of the PPoF approach is presented in Chapter 3 













CHAPTER 3:   ASSESSMENT OF STEAM GENERATOR 
TUBE RUPTURE FREQUENCY FOR A TYPICAL 
HELICAL SMALL MODULAR REACTOR DESIGN 
 
 
3.1  Small Modular Reactor Steam Generator Tubes 
 
 
The PPoF based SGTR frequency assessment approach has been applied to a new 
design of SMR SGs consisting of helically-coiled tubes, to determine the SGTR 
frequency. One important distinction from large scale PWRs is that these SMR designs 
do not have the large diameter coolant loop pipes. Hence, the injection pump capacity in 
these designs is much lower than large scale PWRs. Therefore, even small leakage rates 
would be critical for these SMR designs. In this research, we do not follow the LOCA 
category definitions that were basically influenced by the large diameter coolant loop 
pipes, and include small leakage rates in the definition of SGTR.  
The helical SG design used in SMRs is very different thermal-hydraulically and 
geometrically from U-tube SGs used in conventional PWR plants (Jo et al., 2008). Each 
SG coil is a once-through heat exchanger with many helically coiled tubes (Figure 23). 
Preliminary probabilistic risk analysis developed in support of the typical helical design 




            
Figure 23: Helical tubes (left) and top view of tubes with support points (right) 
 
 
In the helical SG design, primary coolant (superheated light water) flows downward 
externally to the tube through the tube bundle by natural circulation at higher pressure 
and temperature, whereas secondary coolant (water) flows upward internally through the 
helical tubes at lower pressure and temperature. Thus, the helical tubes are subjected to 
liquid cross-flow externally and multi-phase flow internally. The helical tubes are made 
of Alloy 690, which has almost twice the chromium content of Alloy 600 (Berge & 
Donati, 1981) (tube material in traditional designs), as shown in Table 8. The higher 
chromium content in Alloy 690 material makes them resistant to corrosion related 
mechanisms. The problem with Alloy 600 was that most of the chromium was 
precipitated as carbides at the grain boundaries leading to chromium depletion. However, 
in the case of Alloy 690 material, there is enough chromium left over after the formation 
of carbides at the grain boundaries to form a passivation layer and prevent corrosion. 
Table 8: Composition of Alloy 600 and Alloy 690 materials (wt %) 
 
Cr Fe C Si Mn S Co Ni
Alloy 
600
14-17 6-10 <0.15 <0.5 <1 <0.015 <0.1 Balance (>72)
Alloy 
690
27-31 7-11 <0.05 <0.5 <0.5 <0.015 <0.1 Balance (>58)
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3.1.1 Identification of Degradation Conditions and Mechanisms 
In SMR SGs, fluid flow in the tube bundle generates a flow-induced vibration 
phenomenon, which is composed of fluid-elastic instability, turbulence excitation, and 
vortex shedding. Among the mechanisms of flow induced vibration in PWR SGs, 
turbulence-induced excitation generates random pressure fluctuations around the tube 
surfaces, forcing them to vibrate and inducing enough vibration response to cause long-
term damage (Pettigrew et al., 1991). As has been discussed in the Section 2.5.1, vortex 
shedding and fluid-elastic instability lead to resonant vibration in the tubes, causing 
failure in quick time or overstress failures. These high amplitude vibration excitation 
mechanisms should not occur for normal operating conditions in SGs (Connors, 1981).  
In this research we consider operating stresses resulting from turbulence induced 
vibrations of tubes. We also analyzed other sources of operating stresses, e.g., thermal 
stresses, which can lead to thermal fatigue. However, the helical shape of tube bundle 
accommodates the thermal stresses due to expansion of tubes (e.g., during normal heating 
at start-up) and hence would not contribute significantly to the operating stresses.  
As discussed earlier, with the use of Alloy 690 risks from most of the corrosion 
related degradation mechanisms have been mitigated to a great extent. However, Alloy 
690 tubes with pre-existing flaws are more susceptible to fatigue damage due to 
fluctuating stresses resulting from flow-induced tube vibration, and fretting-wear damage 




3.1.2    Finite Element Analysis to Assess the Stress Agents 
The finite element model of one span of the helical All
developed using commercial software ANSYS
developed using the pipe element (PIPE16),
compression, torsion, and bending capabilities. The element has six degrees of freedom at 
two nodes: translations in the nodal x, y, and z directions, and rotations about the nodal x, 
y, and z axes. Simply supporte
each end of the helical span to simulate the support points. 
mean values of geometrical parameters of tubes, and material properties respectively
(actual values are not shown 
considered probabilistically to estimate the response stresses and vibration amplitudes
and associated uncertainties
 
Figure 24: Finite element model of on
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 ANSYS, “Structural Analysis Guide
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oy 690 tube 
26
 v.12.1. The finite element model was 
 which is a uniaxial element with tension
d boundary conditions (as well as symmetry) 
Tables 9 and 1
due to confidentiality issues). All these parameters were 
. 
 
e span of helical tube
,” ANSYS Inc., Canonsburg, PA, 2009. 
(Figure 24) was 
-
were used at 







Table 9: Geometrical parameters of tube 
Geometrical parameters of tube Mean value 
Tube diameter (mm) 15.75 
Tube wall thickness (mm) 1.55 
Coil diameter (mm) 500 
# of support points per helical turn 4 
 
Table 10: Alloy 690 material properties 
 
Alloy 690 material properties Mean value 
Young’s modulus 211000 MPa 





Modal analysis was first performed on one span of the helical tube using ANSYS 
v.12.1 to obtain the natural frequencies and the modal stresses. The reduced method was 
used for the eigenvalue and eigenvector extractions to calculate first five natural 
frequencies. All degrees of freedom in the y-direction were selected as master degrees of 
freedom (MDOF). Table 11 lists the natural frequencies for first five modes of vibration. 
Table 11: Natural frequencies from Modal analysis 
 









Random vibration analysis was then carried out assuming a constant damping factor 
and a random uniform force PSD (nodal excitation). A frequency range of 0.1 to 70 Hz 
was used as an approximation to the PSD forcing function frequency. Force PSD 
calculations were carried out using Equations (37) and (38). Standard assumptions were 
used to carry out random vibration analysis: there is negligible fluid-elastic force; PSD 
force is relatively constant over the frequency range close to the tube natural frequency; a 
single mode dominates the tube displacement and coupling between modes is negligible; 
and gap velocity caused by turbulence in a tube bundle is homogeneous along a tube span 
(Blevins, 1994; Taylor & Pettigrew, 2000). 
The critical velocity in the tube bundle for first natural frequency was determined in 
order to ensure that there is no fluid-elastic instability in the tube bundles for the velocity 
range of interest. A 2-D thermal hydraulic analysis provided the gap flow velocities 
across various regions of the tube bundle. These gap flow velocities were used to 
determine the PSD forces. Due to confidential nature of the data, the PSD force values, 
stress results, and other parameters (e.g., damping factor, gap flow velocities) are not 
provided in this dissertation. Maximum PSD stresses were determined for gap flow 
velocity range (obtained from thermal hydraulic analysis) for various locations along a 
helical span (Figure 25). For each location or node along a helical span, RMS values of 
maximum stresses for all possible gap flow velocities were then calculated. Stress values 
were used in the fatigue PPoF model, whereas vibration amplitudes at the tube/support 
locations were used to calculate the normal force initiating wear and rate of change of 
sliding distance with time, which were used in the fretting-wear PPoF model for 




Figure 25: Random vibration stresses along helical span of SG tube 
 
3.2  Assessment of Steam Generator Tube Rupture Frequency 
Pre-service inspection is performed to detect any pre-existing defects in tubes that 
may have resulted during manufacturing or transportation. It is important to detect such 
defects since degradation mechanisms often initiate from such defects to failure. There 
have been cases in the past when tube rupture occurred from flaws that originated during 
fabrication and packaging. For example, a US NRC report (US NRC, 2004) stated that a 
tube had a leak in a replacement SG (tubes made of Alloy 690) at the Palo Verde nuclear 
generating station, which was attributed to a flaw (dent) that originated during packaging 
and handling.  
The SMR designs in consideration are still in pre-licensing stage, and hence no pre-
service inspection data was available. Since the primary purpose of estimating SGTR 
frequency in this research is to demonstrate the utility and applicability of the PPoF 
approach, initial crack size and density distribution used in this paper were hypothetically 
derived from in-service inspection data for PWR SG Alloy 690 tubes (through-wall 











σrms = rms bending stresses
yrms = rms vibration amplitudes
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cracks) (Liao & Guentay, 2009). The data were scaled to represent potential fabrication 
flaws to a reasonable extent. The scaled data was further prorated for total number of 
tubes in the SMR. The initial flaw size was assumed to follow the gamma PDF, with 
higher size flaws having lower probability densities. The flaw density (number of flaws 
in a segment) was generated for each segment assuming Poisson distribution (Chatterjee 
& Modarres, 2012).  
Fatigue and fretting-wear mechanisms in helical Alloy 690 SG tubes were simulated 
using their PPoF models under turbulence-induced random vibration stresses and forces 
(calculated in the previous section). The simulation of failures were performed using 
developed MATLAB routines (Chapter 2), and resulting uncertainties in SGTR 
frequency is presented in terms of probability densities, confidence limits, and box and 
whisker plots (Fatigue – Figure 26; Fretting wear – Figure 27; Total – Figure 28). Finally, 
we compare the results of the calculated total SGTR frequency for SMRs with that of 








Figure 27: Uncertainty representation of SGTR frequency due to fretting-wear 
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Figure 28: Uncertainty representation of total SGTR frequency  
3.3  Discussion of Results 
The PPoF estimation of total SGTR frequency for SMRs was compared with that of 
historical SGTR frequency currently used for PRA of PWRs. The historical SGTR 
frequency (which is of the order of 10
-3
) is based on past ruptures in operating PWR 
designs that have different tube lengths, primary to secondary side pressure differential 
and dominated by the SCC mechanism. Hence, for proper comparison with the calculated 
PPoF-based frequency for SMR designs, the historical data-based SGTR frequency was 
prorated based on total tube length, pressure differential and failure mechanisms 
(Chatterjee & Modarres, 2012).  
For example, approximately 70% of past failures of SG tubes were caused by the 
SCC mechanism (Diercks et al., 1996), which has a very negligible chance of occurrence 
in new SMR designs because of advanced tube materials (Alloy 690) with higher 
chromium contents, and different boundary conditions (high pressure primary loop on the 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
x 10
-4
Total SGTR frequency (/year)
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shell side). Hence, the operating PWR SGTR historical frequency estimate was scaled 
accordingly to consider only failures caused by failure mechanisms other than SCC and 
related corrosion mechanisms (e.g., fatigue, fretting wear), the tube length and pressure 
differential of a typical helical SMR design. The scaling assessment resulted in an 
estimated SGTR frequency for SMR of around 8x10
-5
. Hence, the PPoF-based SGTR 
frequency estimate calculated in this paper, while being a bit on the conservative side 
(due to higher flow-induced vibrations in helical tube bundles), is more relevant and 
reliable given that actual degradation conditions prevailing in SMR designs and the 
corresponding mechanical, electrical, thermal, and chemical processes leading to failure 
have been formally considered while estimating the SGTR frequency. 
The SGTR frequencies estimated through the PPoF approach can support PSA of 
SMRs to determine potential and frequency of severe adverse consequences. It is also 
necessary to update the pre-service prediction of SGTR frequency using the health 
condition information obtained from in-service inspections. Often during service stage, 
many degradation conditions affect the tubes, e.g., accidents, emergency shut-down for 
maintenance. Hence, the degradations in tubes may not propagate as anticipated during 
the licensing phase. However, in-service inspection data are highly uncertain in nature 
due to detection uncertainties and measurement errors associated with the nondestructive 
evaluation methods. Chapter 4 presents a Bayesian probabilistic approach for estimating 







CHAPTER 4:   BAYESIAN PROBABILISTIC APPROACH 
FOR ESTIMATING DEFECT SEVERITY IN STEAM 






4.1  Historical Perspectives on Steam Generator Tube In-Service Inspections 
 
 
SGs are critical components of a PWR, and have a number of important safety 
functions, e.g., keep the reactor core at a safe temperature, and act as a barrier between 
the primary and secondary sides of a nuclear plant. Failure of SG tubes can contribute 
significantly to nuclear power plant station unavailability. It is critical to ensure that SG 
tubes perform reliably consistent with their licensing basis and satisfactorily meeting the 
applicable regulatory requirements. This can be achieved through in-service inspection of 
the SG tubes in order to detect the presence of unknown existing defects, and then 
characterize them. If these unknown defects are not detected and characterized 
effectively, they can impair tube integrity. 
At the beginning in-service inspection of SG tubes of water-water energetic reactors 
(WWER), a series of PWRs developed by Russia, was based on the leakage tests 
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007). Based on the results of the leakage tests, 
defective or damaged tubes were identified and were subsequently plugged with various 
types of plugs (e.g., welded and mechanical).  
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Since the early seventies, nondestructive evaluation methods such as eddy current 
inspection techniques were developed and used on PWR SGs and also later on WWER 
SGs (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007). Eddy current inspection technique 
detects the existence of tube damage by measuring distortions in eddy current signals that 
are induced in the tubes using probes. Only 100% through-wall cracks can be detected 
through leakage tests, while defects of various sizes can be detected using eddy current 
inspection, so that tubes with the potential to leak before next inspection can be plugged. 
A plugging criterion of 40% through-wall thickness was adopted in general by most 
countries (Clark & Kurtz, 1988). This plugging criterion was calculated for PWR SGs 
with Alloy 600 tubes, with specific tube diameters and thickness, and specific 
degradation mechanism (wastage) (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007).   
4.2  Uncertainties Associated with Nondestructive Evaluation Methods 
Nondestructive evaluation equipments (e.g., eddy current) are often used to detect and 
characterize unknown existing defects
27
 or degradations in structural components. 
Reliable detection and measurement of such hidden defects (rogue defects) is crucial for 
structural health diagnosis purposes. Nondestructive evaluation equipments are quite 
complex and it requires considerable skills from the operators to extract useful data from 
them. For example, ultrasonic-based nondestructive test equipment induces ultrasonic 
pulses into structural components, detects reflected ultrasonic pulses from defects or 
discontinuities, and then displays them in the form of electric signals (e.g., voltage). 
These electric signals are then analyzed and processed to provide quantitative estimates 
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 In this research defect may indicate a crack, flaw, pit, or any other degradation in a structural component. Size may refer to either 
through-wall depth or surface length of a defect, unless specified. Density refers to number of defects in a given volume. 
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of unknown existing defects that require careful consideration of various factors (e.g., 
physics-of-failure) on the part of the analyst, whose level of experience is a critical 
determinant of the quality of the evaluation. Hence, nondestructive evaluation process 
induces considerable detection uncertainties and measurement errors into the defect size 
and density estimates (Figure 29) (Chatterjee & Modarres, 2011).  
 




4.2.1 Probability of Detection and Associated Uncertainties 
A defect of a given size might be detected only a certain percentage of the time (out 
of total attempts during nondestructive testing) depending on factors such as, noise level, 
test probe sensitivity, test equipment repeatability and human error. Hence, a defect has 
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an associated POD, which can be defined as the probability the inspection will detect the 
defect of true size, , and is denoted by  (Kurtz, Heasler & Anderson, 1992). The 
data from which POD curves are generated can be categorized into two types: qualitative 
data, i.e., hit/miss; and quantitative data, i.e., signal response amplitude ( ¢dv. , where 
£ is signal response. The hit/miss data type is based on a binary process, i.e., whether a 
defect is detected or not detected (Figure 30). In Figure 30, D is the random variable that 
assumes a value of 1 representing detections, and a value of 0 representing non-
detections. 
 
Figure 30: Hit/miss data 
 
Hit/miss data are obtained from test equipments such as Sonic IR, and are very 
subjective in nature depending on operator experience (Li & Meeker, 2008). This induces 
uncertainty in the values of the POD generated for the hit/miss data. This kind of data 
provides less information than signal data, since it lacks repeatability. Also, in this data 
only the inspection outcome is known, but no information is available about the defect 























detection over the total number of inspections performed for a particular defect size, and 
is called the averaged POD (Eq. 45).  
  ¤OZ? i> v¤Zvv>¤h 
ZTZT/i&viTh &¤OZ? i> /&vZT/i&v                              45 
These POD values are for discrete defect sizes. In order to obtain continuous POD 
curve (Figure 31), the logarithm of the odds is assumed to be correlated to the true size of 
defect (Eq. 46). This correlation is often assumed to be linear or log-linear. Based on this, 
the POD is modeled using a logistic function for this data type (Georgiou, 2006; Jenson, 
Mahaut, Calmon, & Poidevin, 2010), as shown by Eq. (47), where,  is the set of 
parameters of the POD logistic model, and U is the model error. A regression analysis is 
then performed to fit a continuous curve to the averaged POD values, as shown in Figure 
31. Uncertainties associated with the logistic model and data are characterized through 
the regression analysis in terms of probability distributions of parameters  and model 
error. 
hij ¥ 1  ¦ L                                                  46 




Figure 31: POD curve for hit/miss data 
 
The other type of POD data is more continuous in nature and is a measure of the 
amplitude of signal response recorded by the nondestructive test equipment, e.g., 
ultrasonic or eddy current. Signal is the measured response of the nondestructive 
evaluation system to a defect. The unit of measured signal depends on the inspection 
equipment, and can be number of counts, volts, scale divisions, or pixels. For signal 
response data, much more information is supplied in the signal for analysis than is in the 
hit/miss data. The defect signal detection capability of inspection equipment depends on 
various factors, such as noise, repeatability, human error, material properties of 
component evaluated, and defect attributes. The noise factor is very important for 
detecting small defect sizes, because noise and signal distribution overlap. Hence, it is 
very critical to determine the noise distribution appropriately. In the signal response data-
based POD estimation method, the most important parameters are the inspection 
threshold and the decision threshold (Figure 32).  








Figure 32: Signal vs. Noise 
 
Inspection threshold is the smallest value of defect signal that the nondestructive 
evaluation system records, whereas decision threshold is used to make detection/non-
detection decisions. A signal above a decision threshold is considered as “detected” while 
a noise that is above this threshold is considered as false call
29
. Decisions threshold is 
selected based on noise distribution, operator experience, and field inspection experience. 
Decision threshold is always equal to or higher than the inspection threshold. If decision 
threshold is chosen to be above the upper bound of noise distribution then there will be 
no possibility of false call. However, there is always a trade-off between detecting small 
flaws and probability of false call (o3). If decision threshold is chosen to be below the 
noise upper bound (Figure 32) then there is an associated false call probability which 
needs to be adjusted in the POD. Then probability of indication (f) can be written as 
shown by Eq. (48) (Department of Defense, 1999). 
                                                          
29
 A nondestructive test equipment response interpreted as having detected a crack but associated with no known crack at the 












f   o3 N ^1  o3_.                          48 
For POD estimation from signal data (Figure 33), it is generally assumed that the 
logarithm of the signal response amplitude is linearly correlated to the logarithm of the 
defect size as shown in Eq. (49), where §s and §ss are the correlation parameters, and U is 
the model error. The model error is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean 
zero and standard deviation A. 
hij£  §s N §sshij N U0, A                                           49 
 
Figure 33: Response amplitude vs. True size 
 
Using the correlation of Eq. (49), a regression analysis is performed (Figure 34) to 
estimate the correlation parameters and the random error. The shaded region in Figure 34 
represents signal amplitudes higher than the decision threshold signal. The POD for a 
defect size is then estimated (Eq. 50) by determining the probability of defect signal (£) 
to be higher than the threshold signal (£01), which is given by a cumulative lognormal 
distribution as shown in Eq. (51) (Georgiou, 2006). Uncertainties in the parameters  §s 














































parameters can be sampled from their respective distributions, which when used in Eq. 
(51) can result in all possible values of POD for a given defect size. 
  £  £01  log£  log£01                              50 
  1  Φ¥log£01  ¬§s N §sshij­A ¦                            51 
 
Figure 34: POD estimation from signal response data 
 
 
In some cases, the signal response data is also converted into equivalent hit/miss data 
(Jenson et al., 2010) by using the decision threshold. Signal responses above the decision 
threshold are considered as detected while those below are considered not detected, as 





































































Eq. (45), which is then fitted into a logistic function by using the same procedure as that 
for hit/miss data discussed earlier in this section. 
 
Figure 35: Equivalent hit/miss data 
 
 
4.2.2 Measurement Error and Associated Uncertainties 
The nondestructive evaluation measurement process must be monitored to ensure that 
the process is operating correctly (Olin & Meeker, 1996). This requires cross-validating 
the measurement results with known defect sizes to estimate the measurement errors and 
associated uncertainties. The precision and accuracy of nondestructive test equipment as 
well as the techniques used to analyze and process the test results contribute to 
measurement errors. For example, large volume of sensor data (such as ultrasound or 
digital images) are filtered, smoothed, reduced, and censored into another form by 
subjectively accounting for only certain features of the data. Also, often measurement 
models are used to convert the form of a measured or observed data into the 
corresponding value of the reality of interest (i.e., defect size). Uncertainties associated 















































True size, a  
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After a defect is detected, the signal amplitudes are processed and analyzed to 
estimate corresponding sizes (Figure 36). Measurement error is then assessed as the 
deviation of measured size from the true value. The true value is obtained from 
destructive evaluations. In classical measurement error, it is assumed that the error is 
independent of, or uncorrelated with, the true value of the underlying variable (Hyslop & 
Imbens, 2001). However, in general there is a correlation between measurement error and 
true value.  
 
Figure 36: Factors affecting measurements30 
 
In order to describe the components of measurement error and associated 
uncertainties, let us consider the measured size distribution, which is obtained through 
repeated measurements of a single defect size (Figure 37). There are two components of 
measurement error: systematic (bias) error and random (stochastic) error (Jaech, 1964; 
Hofmann, 2005). The deviation of the mean of the measured size distribution (Figure 37) 
from the true value gives the bias or the systematic error. Bias or systematic error is 
defined as a continuous deviation in the same direction from the true value (Hofmann, 
2005). Bias can be overestimated or underestimated. Often in the case of nondestructive 
evaluation, bias represents overestimation for small sizes and underestimation for large 
                                                          
30

















sizes (Kurtz et al., 1992; Wang & Meeker, 2005). Other than the bias, there is also a 
random error, which arises due to the scattering or random variation in measured values 
(measurement uncertainty). For nondestructive measurement process to be “in control”, it 
is essential that the measurement precision (randomness) remains constant, and there is 
no appreciable drifting or shifting from the true value (bias) (Olin & Meeker, 1996). A 
method for modeling measurement error is discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
Figure 37: Measurement error components 
 
4.3 Structuring a Bayesian Probabilistic Approach for Estimating True Defect 
Severity accounting for all Uncertainties and Errors 
Past efforts in modeling defect severity in structural components have not been 
successful in considering all the uncertainties and errors associated with nondestructive 
evaluation methods31. Most of the authors have neglected the effect of some uncertainties 
or errors. For example, Rodriguez and Provan (1989) present a method to model pitting 
                                                          
31
 A detailed literature survey has been presented in the introduction section of this dissertation. 
True value
Distribution of repeated size








corrosion based on data from in-service inspection, considering only the POD in a 
simplified manner and ignoring the effect of measurement error. Cizelj and Dvorsek 
(1998) consider the impact of measurement error in inspection data on SGTR probability, 
neglecting the effect of POD. Some authors have considered only big size defects in 
order to overcome the uncertainties associated with detecting and measuring small sizes. 
For example, Datla, Jyrkama and Pandey (2008) present an eddy current inspection-
based pitting corrosion model considering only big size pits (>50% through-wall depth), 
in order to overcome the nondestructive inspection uncertainties associated with small 
sizes. Though detection uncertainties are negligible, there is still considerable 
measurement error (especially systematic error) associated with big sizes.  
Celeux, Persoz, Wandji and Perrot (1999), describe a method to model defects in 
PWR vessels considering the POD and random error in measurements. Yuan, Mao and 
Pandey (2009), followed the idea of Celeux et al. (1999), to propose a model for pitting 
corrosion in SG tubes considering the POD and random error of the eddy current 
measurements. However, both Celeux et al. (1999) and Yuan et al. (2009) did not 
consider the effect of systematic error or bias in measured defect sizes. Further, they did 
not consider uncertainties in the values of the POD, which can affect the defect severity 
estimates considerably.  
In order to address some of the limitations of existing techniques, a Bayesian 
probabilistic approach has been proposed in this research that combines prior knowledge 
of defect size and density with uncertain nondestructive evaluation data, considering the 
POD, measurement errors (systematic and random), and associated uncertainties, to infer 
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the posterior distributions of defect size and density. The combined effect of POD, 
measurement errors, and associated uncertainties on measured defect sizes is captured by 
a likelihood function. In this section, approach to model nondestructive evaluation 
uncertainties, e.g., measurement errors, POD, and associated uncertainties, will be first 
presented; followed by the Bayesian models for defect size and density. 
4.3.1 Approach to Model Nondestructive Evaluation Uncertainties  
Nondestructive evaluation uncertainties consist of POD, measurement errors, and 
associated epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. As discussed in the previous section, the 
analysis of measurement errors is based on assessing the deviation of the measured defect 
size from the actual or true defect size, as shown by Eq. (52):       
   ®                                                                         52 
where,   is the measurement error, ® is measured and  is the true defect size. 
Generally a linear regression relationship of the form shown in Eq. (53) is used to model 
measurement error (Jaech, 1964; Kurtz et al., 1992):     
®   N  N U0, A                                                           53 
where,  and  are regression coefficients obtained through a regression analysis (Figure 
38) of ® dv. , and U is the random error in measurement (scattering of the data), which 
is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation A. This 
standard deviation can also often be a function of defect size, which needs to be verified. 
For example, a form of ¯ ® Z[° ®  can be assumed for standard deviation in the 
regression analysis to estimate the parameters ¯ and °, along with  and . Based on the 
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values of parameter, °, the dependency of standard deviation A on defect size can be 
established. For example, if ° ≈ 0, then A can be assumed to be independent of defect 
size.  
 
Figure 38: Regression analysis of measurement error 
The regression coefficients ( & ) are jointly measure of systematic error or bias in 
measurements. For different values of bias parameters, systematic error can be zero, 
constant, or variable. For example, if   1 &
   0, then systematic error is zero. If 
  1 &
  µ 0, then systematic error is constant. If  µ 1, then systematic error is 
variable. The distribution of bias parameters represents epistemic uncertainty in the 
chosen measurement error model. From Eqs. (52) and (53), the measurement error can be 
expressed as:  
     1 N ¶···¸···¹º)# N U0, A¶·̧ ·¹R+»  """                                               54 
Since nondestructive evaluation data are in the form of measured defect sizes, 
measurement error is further expressed as a function of measured defect size using Eqs. 















     1 ® N ¶····¸····¹
º)# N U0, A¶·̧ ·¹
R+»  """                                             55 
The PDF of the measurement error as a function of measured defect size can then be 
defined using a normal distribution with mean as the bias, k®, standard deviation as that 
of random error, 
C, and measurement error as random variable, as shown in Eqs. (56) and 
(57). 
j®    ]k® , Ab                                                         56 
j®   1¼2J ]Ab* Z
 *]Cb½¾D¿]
 b® À½                                     57 
 
All the defects in a structure are not detected during nondestructive testing. The 
probability of detection of a defect depends on its true size and is represented by the POD 
curve. The POD of a defect of true size, , can be represented by a function 
|, 01, where,  is vector of parameters of the POD function, and 01 is 
detection threshold size below which the POD assumes a value of zero. The POD 
function is selected based on the type of data, e.g., hit/miss (logistics) or signal response 
(lognormal) as discussed in Section 4.2.1. The expected POD independent of uncertain 
parameters,  can then be expressed as shown in Eq. (58), where, g represents the 
joint PDF of the parameters of the POD function. The joint PDF, g, represents the 




Á                                                               58 
4.3.2 Bayesian Model for Estimating True Defect Size  
Due to associated POD, all defects of a given size may not be detected during 
nondestructive testing. Further, it may also be possible that no defects are detected for 
very small-sized defects (above detection threshold). Small-sizes defects have low PODs 
associated with them and hence reliable characterization of such defects is often not 
possible. Therefore it may be possible that “no-detection” category is assigned to those 
small defect sizes. In this section, the likelihood functions are derived for both detections 
as well as non-detections cases.  
4.3.2.1  Likelihood Function for Detections: 
The conditional probability of a true defect size, , given that the defect is detected 
can be expressed as (Celeux et al., 1999):  
?  e   N 
|  1  ? P  e   N 
 Â   1S?   1
 ?  e   N 
 . ?   1|  e   N 
?   1              59 
where, A is true defect size random variable, and D is a binary random variable 
indicating whether or not a defect is detected, i.e., D=1 if defect is detected and 0 
otherwise. Limit 
 Ã 0 was applied to both sides of Eq. (59) to obtain the conditional 
probability of detecting a defect of true size, , as shown in Eq. (60): 
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lim»Ã7?  e   N 
|  1
  >|x  yÆÇÈx                                   60 
where, >|x is the PDF of true defect size given the vector of the PDF parameters, x, 
and yÆÇÈx is the marginal POD that is a function of x only (independent of defect 
size), and can be expressed as: 
         yÆÇÈx  Pr  1  ~ >|x
                                       61Ë7  
Nondestructive evaluation data consists of measured defect sizes (exact or interval) 
and number of detections. In this research, the purpose is to first update prior knowledge 
of true defect size PDF parameters with uncertain nondestructive evaluation data 
considering measurement errors and POD; and then update the defect density (number of 
defects per unit volume) distributions based on posterior true defect size PDF parameters. 
The likelihood function of true defect size PDF parameters, x, given nondestructive 
evaluation data consisting of & ®  defects detected with exact size measurements, can be 
represented (using Eq. 60) considering measurement errors, as shown in Eq. (62), where, 
T  0» 0 represents exact defect size detections data: 
Vx|T  0» 0  T  0» 0|x
 1PyÆÇÈxS+¿® Ì ~ )®   >^)®   |x_j® 
              62D¿
+¿®
),  
An alternative way of expressing Eq. (62) is to correct measured defect sizes for 
measurement errors first by using Eq. (63), and then express the likelihood function in 
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terms of true defect size, as shown in Eq. (64). This helps in reducing the complexity of 
the likelihood function and makes Bayesian inference computation easier. 
  ~®   j® D¿ 
                                                  63 
From Eq. (57), corresponding to each random sampling of bias and random error 
parameters, there is a probability distribution of measurement error. Hence, for each 
realization of measurement errors, an expected value of true defect size
32
 corresponding 
to a measured size is estimated using Eq. (63). The Eq. (62) can then be also expressed 
as: 
            
Vx|T  0» 0  T  0» 0|x
 1PyÆÇÈxS+¿® Ì)>)|x                                     64
+¿®
),  
          
Nondestructive measurements are in most cases interval or left censored, in which 
case the likelihood function of x given nondestructive evaluation data consisting of 
&)+0 "Í,Î®  defects detected with interval size measurement, i.e., lying in the Ï01 size 
interval (Î, Î), can be expressed considering measurement errors, as shown in Eq. 
(65). Eq. (65) can also be expressed in terms of true defect size by correcting for 
measurement errors first as shown in Eq. (66). 
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 In some cases depending on measurement error distribution, it is possible that the expected value of true defect sizes obtained using 




Vx|T)+0» 0  ÎT)+0» 0|x 
 ÐÑÒÓÔÕ Õ ®   >^®   |x_j® 
 D¿®Ö×® 
®+EFØ¿ÙÚGÛ,®                  65  
 
Vx|T)+0» 0  ÎT)+0» 0|x




+EFØ¿ÙÚGÛ,®                                        66 
   
In Eqs. (65) and (66), T)+0» 0 represents interval (or a left33 censored interval) 
defect size detections data.  
 
4.3.2.2  Likelihood Function for Non-Detections 
For small defect sizes (above detection threshold) with low POD values, 
nondestructive evaluations can often result in “no-detections”. The conditional 
probability of a true defect size given that the defect is not detected   0 can then be 
expressed as:  
?  e   N 
|  0  ? P  e   N 
 Â   0S?   0
 ?  e   N 
 . ?   0|  e   N 
?   0              67 
Limit 
 Ã 0 was applied to both sides of Eq. (67) to derive the conditional 
probability of not detecting a defect of true size, , as shown in Eq. (68): 
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 For left censored data the lower defect size integral limit in likelihood function assumes a value equal to that of the detection 
threshold. This is because POD assumes a value of zero for defect sizes less than the detection threshold. 
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lim»Ã7?  e   N 
|  0
  >|x  1  1  yÆÇÈx                          68 
 
The likelihood function of x given non-detections data can be expressed as shown in 
Eq. (69), where, T++» 0 represents non-detections data, 01 is detection threshold 
below which POD = 0, and » is true defect size (after correcting measured size »®  for 
measurement error using Eq. 63) below which “no-detections” decisions have been made.  
 
Vx|T++» 0  T++» 0|x
 11  yÆÇÈx ~ 1  >|x
Þ
Øß 
         69 
 
4.3.2.3  Combined Likelihood Function (Detections and Non-Detections) 
The likelihood function of true defect size PDF parameters, x, given nondestructive 
evaluation data consisting of both detections as well as non-detections can then be 
expressed as shown in Eq. (70), where, interval data consists of M defect size intervals 
each with certain number of defects (Z. j. , &)+0 "Í,Î ®  in Ï01 interval):  
Vx|T  T|x
 T  0» 0|x Ì^ÎT)+0» 0x_àÎ,




Vx|T  T|x 
PÐÑÒÓÔSF¿® ∏ Õ )®   >^)®   |x_j® 
 D¿+¿®), 
∏  ÐÑÒÓÔÕ Õ ®   >^®   |x_j® 
 D¿®Ö×® 
®+EFØ¿ÙÚGÛ,®àÎ,  
ÐÑÒÓÔÕ 1  >|xÞØß 
                                                                                            71  
 
Eq. (71) can also be expressed in terms of true defect size by correcting measured 
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The posterior distribution of true defect size PDF parameters, x, can then be 
estimated using Bayesian inference as: 
Jx|T  T|xJ7xÕ T|xJ7x
xÔ                                                        73 
where, Jx|T is posterior distribution of x given nondestructive evaluation data, 
and J7x is prior distribution of x. In order to consider and propagate the epistemic and 
107 
 
aleatory uncertainties associated with measurement errors, different realization of 
measurement error PDF can be obtained using Eq. (57) for each random value of bias and 
random error parameters. Corresponding to each realization of measurement error PDF, 
posterior distribution of true defect size PDF parameters is obtained using Eq. (73). 
Finally, all realizations of the posterior distribution are combined to determine the 
weighted average distribution for the true defect size PDF parameters. The posterior 
values of true defect size PDF parameters can then be used to estimate the corresponding 
marginal POD values (Eq. 61). The marginal POD values would then be used in deriving 
defect density model as presented in next section. 
 
4.3.3 Bayesian Model for Estimating True Defect Density  
The likelihood function of true number of defects, &, given observed number of 
defects, &®  & ® N ∑ &)+0 "Í,Î®àÎ,  can be expressed by a binomial function (detection 
process is binary, i.e., either detection or no detection), as shown by Eq. (74): 
  
V&|&®  &®|&  ] &&®b PyÆÇÈxS+®P1  yÆÇÈxS++®                        74 
 
where, yÆÇÈx is the marginal POD value corresponding to posterior defect size PDF 
parameters, x, and ^ ++®_  &! ¬&®! &  &®!­⁄ , where &! represents factorial of &. In Eq. 
(74), the true number of defects, &, is unknown whereas &® and yÆÇÈx are known. The 




        
J&|&®  &®|&J7&∑ &®|&J7&+                                                               75 
 
where, J&|&® is posterior distribution of true number of defects given the observation, &®, and J7& is the prior distribution of number of defects. The prior distribution of 
number of defects can be estimated from a Poisson function, which gives the probability 
of observing n total number of defects in a volume n, given prior defect density  as 
shown in Eq. (76). Here Poisson distribution is used because defects are assumed to occur 
with the same average intensity and independent of each other. 
   
J7&  Zäå n+&!                                                             76 
                            
The posterior distribution of true number of defects (Eq. 75) can then be used to 
obtain the posterior defect density. The standard conjugate prior employed for Poisson 
distribution likelihood (Eq. 76) is a two-parameter gamma distribution (Simonen, Doctor, 
Schuster, & Heasler, 2003), in which case the posterior has the same functional form as 
the gamma distribution. Assume that prior distribution of defect density is: 
 
J7  j|u, u*                                                   77 
 
 where, u and u* are parameters of gamma distribution. Then the posterior distribution 
of defect density can be expressed as shown in Eq. (78).  
109 
 
        
J  j|n N u, & N u*                                              78 
4.3.4 Summary of Proposed Bayesian Approach  
The proposed Bayesian approach (as summarized by Figure 39) improve upon 
existing techniques because it considers the detection uncertainties and measurement 
errors associated with nondestructive evaluation methods in a comprehensive manner. 
Further, the Bayesian approach incorporates prior knowledge of defect size and density, 
which is critical given the limited evidence or data available from nondestructive 
evaluations. For example, if instead maximum likelihood method is used to obtain point 
estimates of defect model parameters based only on the limited evidence, the results 
would not be reliable. To summarize, the proposed Bayesian approach considers both 
components of measurement errors (i.e., systematic and random) and associated 
uncertainties; considers probability of detection and associated uncertainties; incorporates 
prior knowledge of defect size and density; provides a framework for updating 
probability distributions of defect model parameters when new data become available; 






Figure 39: Bayesian approach for estimating true defect size and density 
 
 
Further, there is a need for a tool to compute the Bayesian inference, so that the 
proposed Bayesian approach can be implemented for practical applications. WinBUGS is 
software that uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods for Bayesian analysis. 
However, two characteristics of the proposed Bayesian approach make WinBUGS not 
applicable. Firstly, the likelihood function (Eq. 72) consists of integration (WinBUGS 
does not provide integral function) and secondly, the likelihood function is not a standard 
PDF (e.g., normal). However, both these limitations can be overcome using 
OpenBUGS
34
, which is an open source variant of WinBUGS. OpenBUGS is software for 
the Bayesian analysis of complex models using MCMC. An OpenBUGS routine was 
                                                          
34
 http://www.openbugs.info/w/ 
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developed for solving the complex Bayesian inference of the proposed approach, which 
estimates the posterior distribution of true defect size PDF parameters. Simultaneously a 
MATLAB routine was also developed to implement the entire proposed Bayesian 
approach for estimating true defect size and density in structural components. An 
application of the proposed Bayesian approach is provided in Chapter 5 to estimate real 
defect size and density distributions based on uncertain in-service eddy current evaluation 
data. 
 
4.4 An Integrated Approach Incorporating Bayesian Results for Assessing In-
Service Steam Generator Tube Rupture Frequency  
The defect size and density distributions estimated using the proposed Bayesian 
approach represent the health condition of the tubes at the inspection time. This can be 
used in the PPoF-based approach presented in Chapter 2 to estimate the SGTR frequency 
distributions. Using the PPoF-based approach, the degradation mechanisms can be 
simulated starting from the real health condition (defect size and density distributions 
determined through proposed Bayesian approach) at in-service inspections, to estimate 
the final defect size distributions at the mean life of the SG as shown in Figure 40.  
The SGTR frequency for the remaining life of the SG can then be estimated by the 
probabilistic approach described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Since, in-service 
inspections are generally performed every 3 years (approximately), the SGTR frequency 
distributions can be estimated for every inspections to support in-service PSA of SMRs 




Figure 40: Flaw growth simulation using PPoF models starting from health 
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CHAPTER 5:   ESTIMATING TRUE FLAW SIZE AND 
DENSITY DISTRIBUTIONS BASED ON IN-SERVICE 
EDDY CURRENT EVALUATION DATA 
 
 
SG tubes are critical component of a PWR, and their failure can lead to catastrophic 
consequences. Several degradation mechanisms can affect the integrity of SG tubes 
during its operating lifetime. The accumulated damage due to these degradations may be 
in the form of cracks, pits, or flaws. Proactive maintenance activities are needed to detect 
defective or damaged SG tubes so that the health of those SG tubes can be restored. 
Therefore it is necessary to timely detect and characterize unknown existing tube defects 
considering the nondestructive evaluation uncertainties, and estimate the SGTR 
frequency.  
The proposed Bayesian approach is used for estimating real/true defect size and 
density in SG tubes using eddy current nondestructive evaluation measurements, which 
included flaw sizes (through-wall depth). The eddy current evaluation technique, which is 
currently the main method for SG tube inspection during periodic safety maintenance, 
uses probes to detect the existence of tube damage by measuring distortions in the eddy 
current signals induced in the tubes. In power plant technical specifications, the SG tube 
plugging limit is generally set with respect to the flaw through-wall depth regardless of 
the flaw surface length. Hence, the flaw length data are generally not reported in the in-
service inspection reports (Liao & Guentay, 2009). Since there is no operational data 
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available for the SMR design in consideration (still in pre-licensing stage), in-service 
eddy current inspection data for SG tubes from literature were considered to demonstrate 
the applicability of the Bayesian approach in estimating actual defect size and density 
considering all the detection uncertainties and measurement errors. In the following 
sections, POD and measurement errors are first modeled for eddy current testing using 
available data from literature, and then the proposed Bayesian approach is used to 
estimate the posterior distributions of true flaw size and density. 
5.1  Modeling Eddy Current Evaluation Uncertainties 
The eddy current measurement error is assessed in this research by a Bayesian 
regression analysis (Azarkhail & Modarres, 2007) between measured and true flaw depth 
(Figure 42) in light of available data from literature (Kurtz et al., 1990), to estimate the 
bias and random error parameters ,  and A (Figure 43; Table 12). The parameters  ,  
and A obtained through Bayesian regression were then used in Eq. (57) to estimate the 
PDF of measurement error as a function of measured flaw depths. 
 





































Table 12: Measurement error parameter values from Bayesian regression 
 
Parameters Values æ, A 0.7352, 0.052 æç, Aç 0.1933, 0.046 A 0.13 
 
In order to derive the POD model, it was assumed in this paper that eddy current 
signal response data were converted into equivalent hit/miss. A logistic function is found 
to best-fit hit/miss data for modeling POD (Georgiou, 2006; Jenson et al., 2010). The 
logistic function used to model POD in this paper is as shown in Eq. (79) (Yuan et al., 
2009):  
|§, §*  è1  1 N Zé×é½1 N Zé×é½                                     >i?    010                                                                   iTtZ?ê/vZ         79 
          
where,  is flaw size, 01 is threshold size for detection, and § and §* are logistic 
function parameters. A flaw of size less than detection threshold will not be detected. The 
POD model parameters § and §* were estimated by fitting Eq. (79) to averaged POD 
data available from literature (Kurtz et al., 1992) using maximum likelihood estimation 
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(MLE) method, as shown in Table 13. Figure 44 illustrates the logistic function curve 
fitted on POD data, with detection threshold (01) assumed to be 0.05 mm. 
Table 13: POD parameters 
 





Figure 44: POD curve 
5.2 Estimating True Flaw Size and Density Distributions Using Proposed 
Bayesian Approach 
Flaws in nuclear reactor components are in most cases best fitted with an exponential 
distribution (Simonen, Doctor, Schuster, & Heasler, 2003; Schuster, Simonen, & Doctor, 
2008) with smaller size flaws having higher probability density. Here the PDF of random 
variable, , i.e., true flaw size in SG tubes, is defined assuming exponential distribution 











True  flaw size (mm)
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                          >|ë  ëZì                                 (80) 
The marginal POD, yÆÇÈë, which is a function of flaw size intensity only, was 
estimated using Eq. (61), as illustrated by Figure 45.  
 
Figure 45: Marginal POD 
 
Since the SMRs are not under operation yet, in-service inspection data available from 
literature for a PWR with Alloy 600 tubes (Dvorsek & Cizelj, 1993) were used to 
estimate the flaw severity distributions. The data will provide a conservative estimate of 
SGTR frequency, since degradations in Alloy 690 tubes would be less than Alloy 600. 
The eddy current evaluation data consisted of through-wall degradation measurements for 
flaws in tubes at all the tube support plate locations in the PWR. This data corresponds to 
in-service inspection at 10 years of PWR operation.  
In most of the PWRs around the world the plugging criterion of 40% through-wall 
depth is still used (Clark & Kurtz, 1988). In this research, all flaw sizes above 40% 
through-wall for all support plates in the PWR were considered as plugged. Further, the 
expected  is very close to 1 for these flaw sizes. The inspection data corresponding 
to flaw size intervals less than 40% through-wall were prorated for total number of tubes 




















in SMRs (≈ 1000 as compared to 5000 in PWR). Table 14 shows prorated in-service 
inspection data for all support plates for all flaws size intervals less than 40% through-
wall (through-wall thickness = 1.5mm).  
  
Table 14: Flaw size measurements (prorated) from eddy current evaluation 
 
Measured flaw size 
intervals (mm)  
Observed # of flaws from eddy 
current inspection  
a < 0.3  62 
0.3 < a < 0.6 6 
 
As is evident from Table 14, the data consisted of both left censored and interval 
measurements. The flaw sizes were corrected for measurement errors using Eq. (63) 
considering various random sampling of measurement error parameters. Table 15 
illustrates observed number of flaws for true flaw size intervals (corresponding to mean 
values of measurement error parameters). A lower bound true flaw size of 0.05 mm was 
assumed for reliable detection of flaws for first interval of Table 14 based on the 
detection threshold.  
Table 15: True size corresponding to Table 14 (corrected for measurement errors) 
 
True flaw size 
intervals (mm)  
Observed # of flaws from eddy 
current evaluation  
a < 0.05 - 
0.05 < a < 0.1451  62 




The likelihood function of true flaw size given the eddy current measurements was 
defined using Eq. (72). The Bayesian posterior inference of the flaw size intensity was 
carried out using the developed MATLAB routine. Uniform prior distribution was 
assumed for flaw size intensity. Several posterior distributions of flaw size intensity were 
obtained corresponding to different expected values of true size (obtained using Eq. 63 
for random sampling of bias and random error parameters), which were used to obtain the 
weighted average posterior distribution of flaw size intensity, as shown in Figure 46. The 
results were also verified using OpenBUGS.  
 




The posterior flaw size distributions were then estimated using Eq. (80) 
corresponding to the mean, 2.5%, and 97.5% values of posterior flaw size intensity as 
shown in Figure 47. Posterior flaw size intensity values were then used to estimate the 
corresponding marginal POD values, yÆÇÈë. The likelihood function of true number of 
flaws given observed number of flaws was then defined using Eq. (74), and the Bayesian 
posterior inference of the true number of flaws (Eq. 75) computed.  




























Figure 47: Posterior flaw size distributions 
 
Uniform prior distribution was assumed for number of flaws to estimate the posterior 
distributions of true number of flaws. The true number of flaws was then used to estimate 
posterior distribution of flaw density for total tube volume in SMR. Figure 48 presents a 
box and whisker plot of true number of flaws by flaw size intervals. Table 16 presents the 
mean of estimated true number of flaws for different flaw depth intervals. 
 
Figure 48: Box and whisker plot of actual/true number of flaws (log scale) 
 






























































Mean number of 
flaws using 2.5% 
lambda (posterior)  
Mean number of 
flaws using 50% 
lambda (posterior)  
Mean number of 
flaws using 97.5% 
lambda (posterior)  
a ≤ 0.05 178.95 251.1 338.2 
0.05 < a ≤ 0.3  156.44  159.8  156.2  
0.3 < a ≤ 0.6  3.73 1.47  0.498 
 
In Table 16, the mean number of flaws estimated using the proposed Bayesian 
approach after considering all uncertainties and prior information, is substantially higher 
than eddy current measurements (Tables 14 & 15), especially for very small sizes. For 
true flaw sizes less than 0.3 mm, the POD has very small values, which is evident in the 
number of actual/true flaws in those ranges. Therefore, it is critical to consider the 
detection uncertainties and measurement errors associated with nondestructive evaluation 
methods, in order to estimate the real defect size and density distributions in SG tubes. 
The defect size and density distributions estimated during in-service inspections can help 
in making appropriate and timely replacement/repair decisions, thereby preventing 
unanticipated failures. For the proposed Bayesian approach to be effective, it is critical to 
characterize the detection and measurement capability of a nondestructive evaluation 
method appropriately, with focus on the end application, e.g., material properties, 
geometry of structural component and defect attributes. This is because the actual/true 




The proposed Bayesian approach was also applied to ultrasonic inspection data for 
Pressure Vessel Research User Facility (PVRUF) flaws. The POD and measurement 
errors for ultrasonic inspection were first modeled, and then the posterior distribution of 
flaw size intensity parameters was obtained using the proposed MATLAB code. The 
posterior parameters were then used to determine the actual number of flaws in the 
vessel. The total actual number of vessel flaws determined using the Bayesian approach 
was found to be consistent with data used by Fracture Analysis of Vessels-Oak Ridge 



















Frequency of SGTR is required in PSA of PWRs to determine the potential of 
radionuclide release. The SGTR frequencies estimated from historical failure data are not 
applicable to new designs of SMR SGs that are substantially different from the operating 
fleet of PWRs. Further, normal operating conditions-induced SGTRs (low leak rate) need 
to be carefully investigated, as they are more vital to the overall safety and operability of 
SMRs than accident-induced SGTRs. This dissertation described the development of a 
probabilistic mechanistic-based approach for determining the frequency of SGTR 
failures. As opposed to using the historical data (which does not exist for the SMRs), the 
approach uses physics-of-failure that models the probable underlying failure mechanisms 
probabilistically (called PPoF).  
Primary failure mechanisms occurring in the SMR SG tubes under the prevailing 
degradation conditions during normal operating conditions were identified, and their 
PPoF models developed. The PPoF models were formulated considering critical variables 
(e.g., among material properties, environmental conditions, stress agents, and geometry) 
that can lead to initiation and propagation of degradations in the tubes. Uncertainties 
associated with unknown or partially known factors such as manufacturing methods, 
material properties, model uncertainties, and measurement errors have been 
characterized. A finite element-based probabilistic approach has been developed to 
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estimate the operational stresses acting on the helical tubes in the SMR SG design under 
normal operating conditions. A probabilistic approach was formulated and a 
corresponding MATLAB routine developed to simulate damage propagation in the tubes 
using proposed PPoF models under the acting stress agents, propagating all the 
uncertainties to predict the distribution of the SGTR frequency.  
An application of the PPoF-based SGTR frequency prediction approach has been 
successfully demonstrated for a typical new design of SMR SGs consisting of helical 
Alloy 690 tubes. Based on the results, it was concluded that fatigue-induced SGTR is 1.5 
times less likely than fretting wear-induced SGTR. The PPoF-based SGTR frequency is 
plant-specific and more representative for use in risk-informed safety assessment of 
SMRs as well as existing PWRs. The PPoF approach can provide an effective tool for the 
evaluation of safety and reliability of SGs as well as other passive systems in SMRs. 
Since the SG tubes are subjected to variety of operating conditions during their life-
cycle, the degradations in tubes may not propagate exactly as anticipated during the 
licensing or pre-service phase. Hence, it is critical to characterize the health condition of 
the SG tubes during in-service inspections, and update the pre-service estimates of the 
SGTR frequency. Tube degradations/defects are usually characterized through 
nondestructive evaluation methods during in-service inspection of tubes. These 
inspection data are highly uncertain in nature due to detection uncertainties and 
measurement errors associated with nondestructive evaluation methods (e.g., eddy 
current). These uncertainties and errors if not considered properly can lead to under- or 
over-estimation of SGTR frequency. This dissertation presented a Bayesian approach that 
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combines prior knowledge of defect size and density with uncertain data from 
nondestructive evaluations, considering the POD, measurement errors, and associated 
uncertainties, to give a probabilistic description of defect size and density.  
The Bayesian approach developed in this research considers both systematic (bias) 
and random error in nondestructive measurements, considers uncertainties in POD values 
and captures the combined effect of POD and measurement errors (including associated 
uncertainties) on measured defect sizes by a likelihood function. The approach is 
applicable to exact, interval, censored, and truncated measurements; and also provides a 
framework for updating parameter distribution as and when new information becomes 
available. For the proposed Bayesian approach to be effective, it is critical to characterize 
the detection and measurement capability of a nondestructive evaluation method 
appropriately, with focus on the end application, e.g., material properties, geometry of 
structural component and defect attributes. An application of the proposed Bayesian 
approach has been provided to estimate real/true flaw size and density distributions in SG 
tubes based on in-service eddy current evaluation data. The flaw size and density 
distributions estimated through the proposed Bayesian approach can be used to update the 
pre-service estimates of the SGTR frequency, which can support risk-informed 
maintenance of SG tubes and regulatory decision-making.  
 Future research efforts should focus on a number of more detailed researches as 
highlighted below: 
1. More detailed 3-D thermal hydraulic analysis of the primary-side fluid-flow 
characteristics (e.g., gap turbulent flow velocities, fluid density) and secondary 
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side in SG tube bundles during normal operating conditions in the SMRs. This 
would help in making more realistic assessment of stresses acting on the tubes 
during normal conditions.  
2. Because of their integral SGs and proximity to core, the effects of neutron 
embrittlement on the SG tube must also be studied and factored into the SGTR 
frequency assessment and health management. 
3. There is need for better characterization of the manufacturing flaw characteristics 
for Alloy 690 tube materials that are used as input in the assessment of the SGTR 
frequency at the pre-service stage.  
4. It is important to expand the scope of nondestructive evaluations to include the 
identification of degradation mechanisms from the detected flaw characteristics.  
5. A more detailed analysis is required to investigate temperature transients-induced 
thermal stresses in the tubes during normal operating conditions, and potential for 
thermal fatigue.  
6. Multi-tube rupture during accident condition should also be studied. This includes 
SGTR-induced pipe-whip, as well as high temperature degraded core-induced 
stresses on in-vessel SG tubes, and possible steam explosion and hydrogen 
detonation during a severe accident condition inside the reactor vessel unrelated 
to the SGTR. 
7. The applicability of current nondestructive inspection techniques (e.g., eddy 
current) to helically-shaped tube bundles proposed for most of the SMRs also 
need to be assessed. This is because the helically-shaped tube bundles may 
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produce new inspection challenges as opposed to U-tube or straight-through tubes 
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